Finn, Suki. Limiting Logical Pluralism
2019, Synthese (198): 4905–4923
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens and Universal Instantiation. I show this through a detailed analysis of the ‘adoption problem’, which manifests something special about MP and UI. It appears that MP and UI underwrite the very nature of a logical rule of inference, due to all rules of inference being conditional and universal in their structure. As such, all logical rules presuppose MP and UI, making MP and UI self-governing, basic, unadoptable, and required in the meta-logic for the adequacy of any logical system.Comment : This is an accessible discussion to logical pluralism and its relation to foundational issues in the epistemology of logic—notably the Adoption Problem. As such it can be included in any syllabus focused on special topics in the philosophy of logic. It does not require much background knowledge of logic or formal systems.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!