Erickson, Evelyn. More Limits of Abductivism About Logic
2025, Studia Logica, 113: 503–322.
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
Logical abductivism is the method which purports to use Inference to the Best Explantion (IBE) to determine the best logical theory. The present essay argues that this is not the case, since the method fails to meet the criteria requisite for the fruitful application of IBE. This occurs due to an intrinsic difficulty in choosing the appropriate evidence and theoretical virtues which guide theory revision in logic: one’s previous conception of logic influences both these choices. Logical abductivism fails, moreover, to select the best logical theory, exactly because a lack of agreement on theory and virtues for Logic. Rather than direct comparison between two options, a more suitable approach to theory revision in logic is piecemeal, because this method neither assumes nor needs a neutral ground from which to start revising theories.Comment: This is an accessible introduction to the contemporary debate regarding "abductivism about logic" (not to be confused with "abductive logic"). It might be included in any course on the epistemology of logic, particularly for anyone interested in so-called anti-exceptionalism about logic.
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