Levenbook, Barbara Baum. That Makes It Worse
1980, The Monist 63 (2):228-245.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Barbara Baum Levenbook
Abstract: Essays on excusing conditions and their correlates, mitigating conditions, usually begin with the assumption that there is general agreement on what the standard excuses are, and on where they are inapplicable. This assumption is justified; criminal law and the history of discussions of excuses have produced accord, though now and then doubts are expressed about particulars. Essays on excuses typically aim not so much to convince one that such-and-such are the general types of excuses but, rather, to show how they work and what their operation reveals about the nature of voluntary acts, full responsibility, etc.Baron. Excuses, Excuses2007, Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (1):21-39-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Joe Slater
Abstract: Justifications and excuses are defenses that exculpate. They are therefore much more like each other than like such defenses as diplomatic immunity, which does not exculpate. But they exculpate in different ways, and it has proven difficult to agree on just what that difference consists in. In this paper I take a step back from justification and excuse as concepts in criminal law, and look at the concepts as they arise in everyday life. To keep the task manageable, I focus primarily on excuses and excusing activities, distinguishing them from justifications as well as from other close relatives, in particular, forgiving and pardoning. I draw upon J.L. Austin-s classic 'A Plea for Excuses,' but expand on his account, suggesting that we offer excuses for reasons besides those he mentions. My hope is that my examination of excuses and excusing activities will help us rethink our views on just how justifications and excuses differ, views which often are worked out without much attention to how these concepts function in everyday life and to the connection between offers of excuses and justifications and the ‘'rules of civility.'Comment: Baron explains the typical distinction between justifications and excuses. Her examination of these concepts draws upon Austin's 'A Plea for Excuses', and use of the everyday concept, she presses for a rethink of how philosophers and legal theorists think about excuses.
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Comment: In a course on moral reasoning