Anderson, Elizabeth. Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology
1995, Philosophical Topics 23(2), pp. 27-58.
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Added by: Olivia Maegaard NielsenAbstract:
This paper aims to defuse the hysteria over value-laden inquiry by showing how it is based on a misapprehension of the arguments of the most careful advocates of such inquiry, an impoverished understanding of the goals of science, a mistaken model of the interaction of normative and evidential considerations in science, and a singular inattention to the empirical facts about how responsible inquirers go about their business.Comment: This text provides useful arguments for feminist epistemologies, especially feminist empiricism, and would be recommended to add in a class on epistemology, feminist epistemology, or the philosophy of science, especially for more advanced students. The text is a reply to a debate between Helen Longino and Susan Haack, so reading the three authors together as part of a section in a seminar would be interesting and would provide some important context for understanding Anderson.
Curtis, Annaleigh. Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach
2014, 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Nathan NobisAbstract: Different strands of thought that arise out of political movements are often difficult to categorize and also often answer to many names. The 'difference approach' to feminism is discussed here, following Haslanger and Hackett. This approach is sometimes also called radical, cultural, or gynocentric feminism.Comment: An introduction to feminism, focusing on 'the Difference Approach' to feminism.
Jenkins Ichikawa, Jonathan. Presupposition and Consent
2020, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly. 6(4)
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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-MooreAbstract:
I argue that “consent” language presupposes that the contemplated action is or would be at someone else’s behest. When one does something for another reason—for example, when one elects independently to do something, or when one accepts an invitation to do something—it is linguistically inappropriate to describe the actor as “consenting” to it; but it is also inappropriate to describe them as “not consenting” to it. A consequence of this idea is that “consent” is poorly suited to play its canonical central role in contemporary sexual ethics. But this does not mean that nonconsensual sex can be morally permissible. Consent language, I’ll suggest, carries the conventional presupposition that that which is or might be consented to is at someone else’s behest. One implication will be a new kind of support for feminist critiques of consent theory in sexual ethics.Comment (from this Blueprint): Here Ichikawa argues that the language of "consent" to sex presupposes that there is a 'requester' who asks for sex and a 'consenter' who then replies yes or no. Ichikawa argues that this reinforces sexist norms of how sex works.
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