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Curtis, Annaleigh. Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach
2014, 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology
Topics: Applied Ethics; Culture; Forms of Government; Gender Sex and Sexuality; Justice; Law and Public Policy; Mental States and Processes
Keywords: feminism; feminist; gender; sexism
Traditions: Analytic; Critical; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Nathan Nobis

Abstract: Different strands of thought that arise out of political movements are often difficult to categorize and also often answer to many names. The 'difference approach' to feminism is discussed here, following Haslanger and Hackett. This approach is sometimes also called radical, cultural, or gynocentric feminism.
Comment : An introduction to feminism, focusing on 'the Difference Approach' to feminism.
Difficulty: Easy
Recommended use: Introductory

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Jenkins Ichikawa, Jonathan. Presupposition and Consent
2020, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly. 6(4).
Topics: Applied Ethics; Communication; Culture; Ethics and Socio-Politics of Language; Forms of Government; Gender Sex and Sexuality; Grammar and Meaning; Justice; Law and Public Policy; Mental States and Processes
Keywords: consent; feminist; philosophy of language; presupposition; rape culture; sex; sexual ethics
Traditions: Analytic; Critical; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-Moore
Abstract:
I argue that “consent” language presupposes that the contemplated action is or would be at someone else’s behest. When one does something for another reason—for example, when one elects independently to do something, or when one accepts an invitation to do something—it is linguistically inappropriate to describe the actor as “consenting” to it; but it is also inappropriate to describe them as “not consenting” to it. A consequence of this idea is that “consent” is poorly suited to play its canonical central role in contemporary sexual ethics. But this does not mean that nonconsensual sex can be morally permissible. Consent language, I’ll suggest, carries the conventional presupposition that that which is or might be consented to is at someone else’s behest. One implication will be a new kind of support for feminist critiques of consent theory in sexual ethics.
Comment (from this Blueprint): Here Ichikawa argues that the language of "consent" to sex presupposes that there is a 'requester' who asks for sex and a 'consenter' who then replies yes or no. Ichikawa argues that this reinforces sexist norms of how sex works.
Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Further

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