Arpaly, Nomy. Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency
2002, Oxford University Press.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Nomy ArpalyPublisher's Note: Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.Comment:Sliwa, Paulina. In defense of moral testimony2012, Philosophical Studies 158 (2): 175-195.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Nick NovelliIntroduction: Moral testimony has been getting a bad name in the recent literature. It has been argued that while testimony is a perfectly fine source for nonmoral belief, there's something wrong with basing one's moral beliefs on it. This paper argues that the bad name is undeserved: Moral testimony isn't any more problematic than nonmoral testimony.Comment: This is a very good, easy to understand article on moral epistemology. The examples used are clear and well-presented, and it would be suitable even for students with no previous experience with moral epistemology. As the issue addressed, moral testimony, is a central one, this article would be recommended for an introductory course in moral epistemology.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
-