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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This paper provides an answer to the question why birth parents have a moral right to keep and raise their biological babies. I start with a critical discussion of the parent-centred model of justifying parents’ rights, recently proposed by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift. Their account successfully defends a fundamental moral right to parent in general but, because it does not provide an account of how individuals acquire the right to parent a particular baby, it is insufficient for addressing the question whether and why there is a right to parent one’s biological child. Such a right is important because, in its absence, fairness towards adequate prospective parents who are involuntarily childless would demand a ‘babies redistribution’; moreover, in societies with entrenched histories of injustice there may be reasons of fairness for shuffling babies amongst all recent parents. I supplement the Brighouse-Swift account of fundamental parental rights by an account of how adequate parents acquire the right to parent their biological babies. I advance two arguments to this conclusion: by the time of birth, the birth parents will have already shouldered various burdens in order to bring children into existence, and are likely to have formed an intimate relationship with the future baby. Denying birth parents who would make at least adequate parents the right to keep their baby would be unfair to them and would destroy already formed parent-baby relationships which, I assume, are intrinsically valuable.
Gheaus, Anca. The Best Available Parent2021, Ethics 131 (3):431-459-
Expand entry
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
There is a broad philosophical consensus that both children’s and prospective parents’ interests are relevant to the justification of a right to parent. Against this view, I argue that it is impermissible to sacrifice children’s interests for the sake of advancing adults’ interest in childrearing. Therefore, the allocation of the moral right to parent should track the child’s, and not the potential parent’s, interest. This revisionary thesis is moderated by two additional qualifications. First, parents lack the moral right to exclude others from associating with the child. Second, children usually come into the world as part of a relationship with their gestational mother; often, this relationship deserves protection.
Comment: This paper takes a position counter to the general philosophical consensus on the right to parent, instead defending a child-centred answer to the question, 'How does one acquire the moral right to parent?' in which the childrens' interests take precedence over potential parents. It would therefore be interesting to read and discuss in the context parental duties and rights, as well as the rights of children.
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Gheaus, Anca. The Right to Parent One’s Biological Babies
2011, Journal of Political Philosophy 20 (4):432-455
Comment: This paper explores questions related to what makes parenting in general legitimate and how individuals acquire the right to parent a particular baby. The author builds on existing discussions in the literature to construct a parent-centric account of why parent's have a protected interest in being the one's to raise their biological offspring. The author's account is intended to complement, rather than compete with, with existing child-centred (fiduciary) arguments. It would therefore be interesting to read and discuss in the context of parental duties and rights, as well as the rights of children.