Schellenberg, Susanna. Perceptual Content Defended
2011, NOUS 45 (4), pp. 714 - 750
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Abstract:
Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to accounts of perceptual content on which perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. With austere relationalists, I will argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational. But against austere relationalists, I will argue that it is fundamentally both relational and representational.Comment: This paper discusses two of the dominant positions regarding the content of perceptual experience. It can be used in an advanced course on philosophy of perception or as further reading.
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