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Added by: Petronella RandellPublisher’s Note:
Many people (both philosophers and not) find it very natural to think that deceiving someone in a way that avoids lying — by merely misleading — is morally preferable to simply lying. Others think this preference is deeply misguided. But all sides agree that there is a distinction. In this book, I undertake a close examination of the lying/misleading distinction. First, I use this very intuitive distinction to shed new light on entrenched debates in philosophy of language over notions like what is said. Next, I tackle the puzzling but widespread moral preference for misleading over lying, arriving at a new view regarding the moral significance of the distinction. Finally, I bring all this together in an examination of historically important and interesting cases, ranging from modern politicians to early Jesuits.
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Saul, Jennifer. Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics
2012, Oxford University Press.
Comment: Useful for philosophy of language or ethics course as a core text on the lying/misleading distinction. Could also be used to draw out the importance of defining what is said in philosophy of language.