Robeyns, Ingrid, Harry Brighouse. Introduction: Social Primary goods and Capabilities as Metrics of Justice
2010, in Brighouse, H. & Robeyns, I. Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1-14.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Carl FoxContent: A very short, but very clear overview of the differences between Rawlsian resourcists and capability theorists over the appropriate metric for distributive justice. It also sets out very nicely and very succinctly the main argumentative strategies employed by both sides in the debate.Comment: Would make good required or further reading in a module on distributive justice, especially in relation to questions about metrics of justice.
Robeyns, Ingrid. Gender and the Metric of Justice
2010, in Brighouse, H. & Robeyns, I. Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 215-236.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Carl FoxContent: A relatively short but very illuminating discussion of the application of two key metrics (social primary goods and capabilities) to the issue of gender injustice in non-ideal circumstances.Comment: Offers a clear account of gender and what falls under 'gender justice'. Easy to read with some useful exposition but a reader would benefit from some background knowledge. Probably best as a specialised or further reading.
Robeyns, Ingrid. Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice
2008, Social Theory and Practice 34 (3):341-362.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Jojanneke VanderveenAbstract: In recent year a growing number of political philosophers have expressed worries about the nature of ideal theory and its dominance in the literature on social justice. Differently, in the post-Rawlsian literature on theories of justice, most of the work done by mainstream political theorists and philosophers is part of what is known as 'ideal theory'.Comment: Very influential article about the use of idealizations in theories of justice, and about the use of partial theories of justice. Cited a lot. Very good resource in a justice class.
Robeyns, Ingrid. Will a Basic Income Do Justice to Women?
2001, Analyse & Kritik 23 (1):88-105
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This article addresses the question whether a basic income will be a just social policy for women. The implementation of a basic income will have different effects for different groups of women, some of them clearly positive, some of them negative. The real issues that concern feminist critics of a basic income are the gender-related constraints on choices and the current gender division of labour, which are arguably both playing at the disadvantage of women. It is argued that those issues are not adequately addressed by a basic income proposal alone, and therefore basic income has to be part of a larger packet of social policy measures if it wants to maximise real freedom for all.
Comment: This paper explores questions as the intersection of feminism and the basic income literature, offering a take on one of the classic feminist critiques of basic income: namely, that the purported conditions of freedom that basic income is supposed to bring about are only really available to members of the population who do not belong to an oppressed or marginalised class. For those that do belong to such groups - in this case, women - the availability of such conditions of freedom will be highly dependent on existing gendered divisions of labour and restrictions on choice. As such, the author argues that proposals for basic income, if they are serious about ensuring real freedom for all, must take this into consideration. The author also challenges existing (at the time of writing) contradictions in the claims being made about the effect of basic income policy on women, as opposed to men. The paper would therefore be interesting to discuss in relation to feminist politics or a survey of the basic income literature, especially assigned in tandem with some of the foundational literature, such as Phillipe Van Parijs' work.
Robinson, Jenefer. Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and its Role in Literature, Music, and Art
2005, Clarendon Press.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag UidhirPublisher's Note: Jenefer Robinson takes the insights of modern scientific research on the emotions and uses them to illuminate questions about our emotional involvement with the arts. Laying out a theory of emotion supported by the best evidence from current empirical work, she examines some of the ways in which the emotions function in the arts. Written in a clear and engaging style, her book will make fascinating reading for anyone interested in the emotions and how they work, as well as anyone engaged with the arts and aesthetics.
Robinson, Jenefer. The expression and arousal of emotion in music
1994, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (1):13-22.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag UidhirAbstract: This essay is about the relation between the expression and the arousal of emotion by music. I am assuming that music frequently expresses emotional qualities and qualities of human personality such as sadness, nobility, aggressiveness, tenderness, and serenity. I am also assuming that music frequently affects us emotionally: it evokes or arouses emotions in us. My question is whether there is any connection between these two facts, whether, in particular, music ever expresses emotion by virtue of arousing emotion. Of course, what it means to say that music expresses emotion is a contentious issue and I shall not be directly addressing it here, although what I say will have implications for any theory of musical expression. Nor will I be examining all the possible contexts in which music can be said to arouse emotion. My focus in this essay will be narrower. The question I shall try to answer is this: Are the grounds on which we attribute the expression of emotion to music ever to be identified with the arousal of that same emotion in listeners?
Robinson, Jenefer, Ross, Stephanie. Women, Morality, and Fiction
1990, Hypatia 5 (2):76-90.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag UidhirAbstract: We apply Carol Gilligan's distinction between a "male" mode of moral reasoning, focussed on justice, and a "female" mode, focussed on caring, to the reading of literature. Martha Nussbaum suggests that certain novels are works of moral philosophy. We argue that what Nussbaum sees as the special ethical contribution of such novels is in fact training in the stereotypically female mode of moral concern. We show this kind of training is appropriate to all readers of these novels, not just to women. Finally, we explore what else is involved in distinctively feminist readings of traditional novels
Robinson, Jenefer. Startle
1995, The Journal of Philosophy, XCII, No. 2
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Jimena ClavelAbstract:
Philosophers tend to take very sophisticated and culture bound emotions as their paradigms for emotion in general. So Gilbert Ryle discusses an interest in symbolic logic; William Lyons discusses being awestruck by the beauty of a golden eagle; Patricia Greenspan talks about being warily suspicious of an insurance salesman; and Robert Gordon talks about being embar rassed about the publicity for one's wedding.' Psychologists, on the other hand, tend to stick to very different examples; several of them have studied the startle reaction as an example of an emo tion, a suggestion most philosophers would consider laughable. I shall argue that startle does belong on the spectrum of emotional response, and that indeed, if we abstract from the startle response, we can come up with a useful model of emotional response in general.Comment: This paper develops a non-cognitive theory of emotions. Robinson begins with a characterization of 'startle' as an emotional reaction. She then generalizes from these characteristics to a more general theory of emotions and emotional reactions. The paper is a helpful introduction to non-cognitive theories of emotions. It is a nice piece to contrast cognitive and non-cognitive theories that focuses on a specific emotion.
Rooney, Phyllis. What is Distinctive about Feminist Epistemology at 25?
2012, in Sharon L. Crasnow, and Anita M. Superson (eds), Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy, Studies in Feminist Philosophy. New York: Oxford Academic.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Jimena ClavelAbstract:
Attempts to identify feminist epistemology by picking out particular topics or projects that supposedly all feminist epistemologists engage, or by focusing on specific claims or theories about knowledge (justification, objectivity) to which all or most feminist epistemologists subscribe, often end up mischaracterizing the field. I argue that what makes feminist epistemology distinctive, a quarter century into its development, is best determined by examining what makes mainstream epistemology still so distinctively non‐feminist. For example, feminist epistemology includes a critical examination of historical and contemporary forms of epistemic subordination and disempowerment that it seeks to bring out from the shadows of traditional theorizing in epistemology, that is, forms of exclusion or distancing of women and other “others” from domains, conceptions, and idealizations of knowledge and of epistemology. This feminist project, though it encompasses quite a range of specific inquiries, is distinctive to the extent that proponents of mainstream projects or perspectives in epistemology remain hostile to, dismissive of, or notably ignorant of it. Mainstream marginalizations and dismissals of feminist work are underwritten by distinctively limited understandings of specific features of epistemological theorizing that come to the fore in an examination of the relationship between feminist and mainstream work in epistemology. These features include: a recognition of the historical situatedness of epistemology; an appreciation of different types of relationships between epistemology and politics; the promotion of epistemological reflexivity; critical re-assessments of starting concepts and questions in epistemology; and recognition of important connections between epistemic normativity and moral or political normativity.Comment: The paper is this a good introduction to the overarching project of feminist epistemology. This chapter offers not only a review of the project of feminist epistemology, but also a critical overview of mainstream epistemology by examining the reception of the former by the latter. It also highlights the crucial contributions of feminist epistemology to epistemology, more widely. In addition to epistemology courses, it can also be a good addition to courses that aim to explore how philosophers have sought to transform canonical and traditional philosophy.
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. Explaining Emotions
1978, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 75, issue 3
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Jimena ClavelAbstract:
Sometimes our emotions change straightaway when we learn that what we believed is not true. The grieving husband recovers when he learns that, because she missed her plane, his wife did not die in the fatal plane crash. But often changes in emotions do not appropriately follow changes in belief. Their tenacity, their inertia, suggests that there is akrasia of the emotions; it reveals the complex structure of their intentionality.'Comment: In this paper, Rorty discusses the complexity of the intentionality of emotions by focusing on the phenomenon of akrasia. The paper can be included in a session on the recalcitrance of emotions or on the intentionality of emotions. The paper can be listed as recommended reading for an advance undergraduate course or as mandatory for a graduate course.
Can’t find it?
Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!