Full textRead freeBlue print
James, Susan. Feminism in philosophy of mind: The question of personal identity
2022, in McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 156-172
Added by: Adriana Alcaraz Sanchez and Jodie Russell
Abstract:
In this essay, James challenges current psychological theories on personal identity - theories arguing that psychological continuity is a criterion for personal identity. James offers a feminist examination of popular thought experiments aimed at showing that one's person's character and memories could be transplanted into someone's else body, thus, preserving a person's survival. According to James, those thought experiments don't take into account the role of the body in constructing one's identity and character, as well as influencing one's memories.

Comment (from this Blueprint): In this article, James argues for a deeply embodied account of personal identity. James claims that current psychological theories on personal identity, tend to overlook the role of the body in maintaining psychological continuity. Mainstream thought experiments used by those theories, for instance, examples of body swap, undermine the extent to which psychological traits of a person depend on a body. James claims that the body is constitutive for developing one's identity and character. Additionally, she offers an analysis of the role of gender on personal identity by examining how patriarchal structures promote the idea that the mind can be independent of the body.

Export citation in BibTeX format

Export text citation

View this text on PhilPapers

Export citation in Reference Manager format

Export citation in EndNote format

Export citation in Zotero format


Share on Facebook
Share on LinkedIn
Share by Email

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *