Full text
Nelson, Lynn Hankinson, Nelson, Jack. Logic from a Quinean Perspective: An Empirical Enterprise
2002, In Falmagne, R.J. and Hass, M. eds. Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic. Rowman & Littlefield
Added by: Franci Mangraviti

From the Introduction: "Lynn Hankinson Nelson and Jack Nelson extend the work begun in the former’s book Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism, by showing that a Quinean understanding of logic as an empirical field implies that logic remains open to revision in light of fundamental shifts in knowledge. Nelson and Nelson point to the revisions in scientific understandings made possible by the incorporation of women and women’s lives as emblematic of the possible ways that feminist thought can provide a deep reworking of the structures of knowledge and thus potentially of logic. Although they are cautious of any conclusions that logic must change, their work offers a theoretical ground from which the effects of feminist theorizing on logic can be usefully explored."

Comment: Lucid and accessible exposition of Quine's ideas on revision, and in particular how they extend to logic. From this perspective it could be used in a course discussing Quine's views on logic, or the 20th century roots of anti-exceptionalism in logic. Also appropriate for a course on feminist logic, to set up one possible avenue. No previous familiarity with Quine's views is required.

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