Shellenberg, Susanna. Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence
, in Symposium withcomments by Matt McGrath, Ram Neta, and Adam Pautz, Philosophical Studies
Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In this paper, the author presents the so-called capacity view, namely, the view that "that perceptual states are systematically linked to what they are of in the good case, that is, the case of a successful perception, and thereby provide evidence for what they are of in the good case". The author discusses the main committments of the view and the implications it has when it comes to the justification of our beliefs and the transparency of our mental states.
Comment: Good as further reading for a postgraduate course on epistemology of percpetion.
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