causal theories of mental representation

Mendelovici, Angela. Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation

2013, Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.

Categories: Color Experience, Metaphysics & Epistemology, Perception, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, Representation in Cognitive Science, Science Logic & Mathematics, Teleological Accounts of Mental Content, The Contents of Perception

Keywords: asymmetric dependence, causal theories of mental representation, colors, mental representation, reliable misrepresentation, teleological theories of mental representation

Expand entry: Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt

Abstract: It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them

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