Hattiangadi, Anandi. Logical Conventionalism and the Adoption Problem
2023, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 97(1), pp. 47–81
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
Abstract: In this paper, I take issue with a core commitment of logical conventionalism: that we impose a logic on ourselves by adopting general linguistic conventions governing our use of logical terms, thereby determining the meanings of the logical constants and which of our inferences are valid. Drawing on Kripke’s ‘adoption problem’, I argue that general logical principles cannot be adopted, either explicitly or implicitly. I go on to argue that the meanings of our logical terms, and the validity of our inferences, cannot depend on our adoption of logico-linguistic conventions.
Comment: Although this paper includes an argument against logical conventionalism (which is in itself interesting), it is also a helpfully clear overview of the so-called Adoption Problem in the philosophy of logic, and can be thus be featured as part of a course on contemporary issues in the epistemology of logic.Ivanova, Milena. Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincare’s philosophy of science2015, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 52 (Part B):114-122.-
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Milena IvanovaAbstract: Poincare is well known for his conventionalism and structuralism. However, the relationship between these two theses and their place in Poincare's epistemology of science remain puzzling. In this paper I show the scope of Poincare's conventionalism and its position in Poincare's hierarchical approach to scientific theories. I argue that for Poincare scientific knowledge is relational and made possible by synthetic a priori, empirical and conventional elements, which, however, are not chosen arbitrarily. By examining his geometric conventionalism, his hierarchical account of science and defence of continuity in theory change, I argue that Poincare defends a complex structuralist position based on synthetic a priori and conventional elements, the mind-dependence of which precludes epistemic access to mind-independent structures.Comment:Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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