Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Lisa Bastian
Abstract: Evolutionary debunking arguments move from a premise about the influence of evolutionary forces on our moral beliefs to a skeptical conclusion about those beliefs. My primary aim is to clarify this empirically grounded epistemological challenge. I begin by distinguishing among importantly different sorts of epistemological attacks. I then demonstrate that instances of each appear in the literature under the ‘evolutionary debunking- title. Distinguishing them clears up some confusions and helps us better understand the structure and potential of evolutionary debunking arguments.
Comment: This is a great paper to read in an introductory yet challenging metaethics course: it is accessible enough to be read by students with little background knowledge but is also interesting to read in that it puts forward an argument and is a good example of current research in the field.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Vavova, Katia. Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism
2015, Philosophy Compass 10(2): 104-116
Can’t find it?
Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!