Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by:
Abstract: In this paper I present an objection to the theory of fictional content known as ‘hypothetical intentionalism’. It centres around the fact that certain sentences in fictions can both imply fictional truths and convey testimony, to be believed by the reader. I argue that hypothetical intentionalism cannot easily make sense of this fact; whereas actual author intentionalism (a rival to hypothetical intentionalism) can.
Comment: This text would be good as further reading for students who are particularly interested in intentionalism and how things can be true in fiction.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Stock, Kathleen. Learning from fiction and theories of fictional content
2016, Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):69-83.
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