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Added by: Berta Grimau
Abstract: This paper deals with the adequacy of the modeltheoretic definition of logical consequence. Logical consequence is commonly described as a necessary relation that can be determined by the form of the sentences involved. In this paper, necessity is assumed to be a metaphysical notion, and formality is viewed as a means to avoid dealing with complex metaphysical questions in logical investigations. Logical terms are an essential part of the form of sentences and thus have a crucial role in determining logical consequence.
Gila Sher and Stewart Shapiro each propose a formal criterion for logical terms within a modeltheoretic framework, based on the idea of invariance under isomorphism. The two criteria are formally equivalent, and thus we have a common ground for evaluating and comparing Sher and Shapiro philosophical justification of their criteria. It is argued that Shapiro’s blended approach, by which models represent possible worlds under interpretations of the language, is preferable to Sher’s formalstructural view, according to which models represent formal structures. The advantages and disadvantages of both views’ reliance on isomorphism are discussed.
Comment: This paper provides an original view on the debate on the adequacy of the modeltheoretic notion of logical consequence as well as a good overview of the relevant part of the debate. It can be used as standing on its own, but it can also serve as a complement to Sher (1996), also written by a female logician, and Shapiro (1998). Adequate for a general course on philosophy of logic or in a more specialized course on logical consequence. The paper is not technical, although students should've have taken at least an introductory logic course.
Sagi, Gil. Models and Logical Consequence
2014, Journal of Philosophical Logic 43(5): 943964.
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