Added by: Carl Fox, Chris Howard
Summary: Considers the particular case of CSMR individuals in detail and makes a strong case for incorporating relational elements into an account of moral personhood.
Comment: Best used as a specialised or further reading addressing the topics of moral personhood and justice. This paper is sure to generate and discussion and debate, particularly when paired Jeff McMahan's work on the topic, to which the paper is responsive (see in particular McMahan, "Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice"). Some of Kittay's arguments rely on somewhat fine metaphysical distinctions, so some background in philosophy would be useful, but the distinctions aren't so fine that any additional reading would be required -- in-class discussion of the nature of the relevant distinctions should suffice.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Kittay, Eva. At the Margins of Moral Personhood
2005, Ethics 116 (1):100-131.
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