Added by: Laura Jimenez
Abstract: The validity of three premises, set as foundational pillars of modern sociological approach to science, is contested, namely: (i) the postulate, stating that science is devoid of whatever generis specifical; (ii) it is liable to the usual empirical study; (iii) the practicing scientist’s self-reflexive judgements must be disbelieved and rejected. Contrariwise, the ignored so far quaint nature of knowledge, escaping even from the elementary empirical treating – discernment and observation – is revealed and demonstrated. This peculiar nature requires, accordingly, a specific meta-cognitive dealing for positing it as ’empirical object’, unfortunately missed still by the Strong Programme. The inadequate approach adopted led to a substitution of ‘scientific’ for common knowledge. The tacit thus far alternative, setting the foundations of meta-science, is suggested.
Comment: Valuable article for both philosophy of science and epistemology courses. Could be used as further reading for postgraduates who want to research topics such as the relation between science and meta-science.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Yaneva, Dominika. What is Science? Methodological Pitfalls Underlying the Empirical Exploration of Scientific Knowledge
2007, Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37(2): 333 - 353.
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