McSweeney, Michaela Markham. Logical Realism and the Metaphysics of Logic
2019 2019, Philosophy Compass. 14:e12563.
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
‘Logical Realism’ is taken to mean many different things. I argue that if reality has a privileged structure, then a view I call metaphysical logical realism is true. The view says that, first, there is ‘ One True Logic ’ ; second, that the One True Logic is made true by the mind ‐ and ‐ language ‐ independent world; and third, that the mind ‐ and ‐ language ‐ independent world makes it the case that the One True Logic is better than any other logic at capturing the structure of reality. Along the way, I discuss a few alternatives, and clarify two distinct kinds of metaphysical logical realism.
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Comment: The paper provides a simple, lucid argument for why many metaphysical views are committed to what the author calls metaphysical logical realism. For the purpose of discussion, it may be paired with an attempt to resist the commitment. More generally, it might be helpful as a survey of logical commitments of metaphysical views.