Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Publisher’s Note: Charles Siewert offers a persuasive argument to show that the presence of certain phenomenal features logically suffices for the presence of certain intentional ones. He claims that this shows that phenomenal features are inherently intentional. I argue that he has not established the latter thesis, even if we grant the logical sufficiency claim. For he has not ruled out a rival alternative interpretation of the relevant data, namely, that intentional features are inherently phenomenal
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Gertler, Brie. The relationship between phenomenality and intentionality: Comments on Siewert’s The Significance of Consciousness
2001, PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
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