Added by: Jamie Collin, Contributed by:
Summary: Wetzel raises an important but underdiscussed argument for Platonism. We quantify over types (contrast with tokens) in sentences that we take to be true. This means we are, prima facie, committed to the existence of types. Wetzel considers various ‘nominalization’ strategies to get rid of type discourse and finds them all wanting. As a result, argues Wetzel, nominalism is untenable.
Comment: This would be useful in a course on metaphysics, ontology, or any course in which the debate between nominalists and platonists is an issue. The paper is short, clear, and relatively untechnical. It raises an important dispute in metaphysics which has not received as much attention as it deserves.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Wetzel, Linda. The Trouble With Nominalism
2000, Philosophical Studies 98(3): 361-370.
Can’t find it?
Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!