Added by: Laura Jimenez
Summary: In this paper the author argues against the common and influential view that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic. The problem with this view, she claims, is not that it conflicts with some antecedently plausible metaphysics of chance or that it fails to capture our everyday use of ‘chance’ and related terms, but rather that it is unstable. Any reason for adopting the position that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic is also a reason for adopting a much stronger, and far less attractive, position. Emery suggests an alternative account, according to which chances are probabilities that play a certain explanatory role: they are probabilities that explain associated frequencies.
Comment: This could serve as a secondary reading for those studying metaphysic theories of chance. Previous background in metaphysics is needed. The paper is recommended for postgraduate students.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Emery, Nina. Chance, Possibility and explanation
2015, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 0(2015): 1–64.
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