Akins, Kathleen. Of sensory systems and the “aboutness” of mental states
1996, Journal of Philosophy 93(7): 337-372.
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Added by: Nick NovelliSummary: The author presents a critique of the classical conception of the senses assumed by the majority of naturalist authors who attempt to explain mental content. This critique is based on neurobiological data on the senses that suggest that they do not seem to describe objective characteristics of the world, but instead act "narcissistically", so to speak, representing information depending on the specific interests of the organism.Comment: This paper provides a good explanation of the integrated sensory-motor approach in philosophy of mind and how it differs from the classical conception. A good, easy to understand presentation of a challenge to the naive view that the senses give us objective information about the way the world is.Anscombe, G. Elizabeth M.. On Sensations of Position1962, Analysis 22 (3): 55-58.
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Added by: Jie GaoSummary: In this paper, Anscombe defends the view that there are various bodily positions, such as sitting cross-legged, that we "just know" about and don't deduce from sensations or feelings any more than we might from visual clues. We use the term "sensation" in such cases as both an external description of what is the case, and as an internal description of what it feels like. The sensation is not broken down into other more primitive data, which we may not even be aware of, though if we were to attend to we might come to know.Comment: This short paper is suitable as a reading for teachings on perception. Given its difficulty for understanding, it might be a good idea to have some supplementary notes together with the original paper in use.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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