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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
There is a tension between our need for associative control and our need for social connections. This tension creates ethical dilemmas that we can call each-we dilemmas of sociability. To resolve these dilemmas, we must prioritize either negative moral rights to dissociate or positive moral rights to social inclusion. This article shows that we must prioritize positive social rights. This has implications both for personal morality and for political theory. As persons, we must attend to each other's basic social needs. As a society, we must adopt a sufficientarian approach to the regulation of social resources.
Comment: This paper presents a unique interpretation of social, moral dilemmas in the context of our rights as social creatures. As such, it could be useful in the context of various social and political philosophical subject areas, including discussions on human rights, the scope of rights and duties, social rights, or alternative perspectives on moral dilemmas. In this sense, it could be used in an introductory moral philosophy course to introduce basic questions about moral dilemmas and the extent to which our social needs can be the subject of those dilemma. It could also be utilised in more advanced courses to examine the nature of socio-economic rights, the extent of our social needs, or to debate the extent to which the satisfaction of social needs constitutes such basic rights as human rights. It is somewhat technical, so introductory-level students may need some extra guidance.Brownlee, Kimberley. Freedom of Association: It’s Not What You Think2015, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 35 (2):267-282-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This article shows that associative freedom is not what we tend to thinkit is. Contrary to standard liberal thinking, it is neither a general moral permissionto choose the society most acceptable to us nor a content-insensitive claim-rightakin to the other personal freedoms with which it is usually lumped such asfreedom of expression and freedom of religion. It is at most (i) a highly restrictedmoral permission to associate subject to constraints of consent, necessity andburdensomeness; (ii) a conditional moral permission not to associate provided ourassociative contributions are not required; and (iii) a highly constrained, contentsensitive moral claim-right that protects only those wrongful associations thathonour other legitimate concerns such as consent, need, harm and respect. Thisarticle also shows that associative freedom is not as valuable as we tend to think itis. It is secondary to positive associative claim-rights that protect our fundamentalsocial needs and are pre-conditions for any associative control worth the name.
Comment: This paper offers a novel account of associative freedom, which counters existing philosophical consensus in the literature and proposes an account grounded in more positive claim-rights that we have as human beings to hold intimate associations throughout our lives. As such, it could be included in a course exploring the fundamentals of social philosophy, as a way to explore the basic requirements we have for social resources, as well as the rights/freedoms/obligations/duties that surround those requirements. It could also be useful as a core text in more traditional topic areas like political theory, human rights, or basic freedoms, or further reading as a counterposition to more traditional claims in those areas.Brownlee, Kimberley. The Lonely Heart Breaks: On The Right to Be a Social Contributor2016, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):27-48-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This paper uncovers a distinctively social type of injustice that lies in the kinds of wrongs we can do to each other specifically as social beings. In this paper, social injustice is not principally about unfair distributions of socio-economic goods among citizens. Instead, it is about the ways we can violate each other’s fundamental rights to lead socially integrated lives in close proximity and relationship with other people. This paper homes in on a particular type of social injustice, which we can call social contribution injustice. The paper identifies two distinct forms of social contribution injustice. The first form involves compromising a person’s social resources so as to deny her adequate scope to contribute socially. The second form involves unjustly misvaluing a person as a social contributor, usually by not taking her seriously as a social contributor.
Comment: This paper offers a unique account of what distinguishes social contribution from other social goods, and makes an interesting defense of contribution as a right. It is especially relevant for discussing the extent to which we have social rights, and determining their scope, or their relationship to basic human rights. It might be useful to offer as further reading for a course on applied ethics, or could be used as a central reading in courses which focus on human rights or social rights. It also puts forward a novel understanding of social injustice which is grounded, not in distribution of goods, but in violation of rights. This aspect of the argument could be relevant to a more general discussion on conceptions of social justice.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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Brownlee, Kimberley. Ethical Dilemmas of Sociability
2016, Utilitas 28 (1):54-72