Added by: Laura Jimenez, Contributed by:
Abstract: A series of recent arguments purport to show that most counterfactuals of the form if A had happened then C would have happened are not true. These arguments pose a challenge to those of us who think that counterfactual discourse is a useful part of ordinary conversation, of philosophical reasoning, and of scientific inquiry. Either we find a way to revise the semantics for counterfactuals in order to avoid these arguments, or we find a way to ensure that the relevant counterfactuals, while not true, are still assertible. In this paper, the author argues that regardless of which of these two strategies we choose, the natural ways of implementing these strategies all share a surprising consequence: they commit us to a particular metaphysical view about chance.
Comment: Really detailed article about counterfactual skepticism and chance pluralism. Could be useful in metaphysics classes, although the paper has consequences for many other fields (eg. philosophy of science). In principle it is recomendable for postgraduate students or senior undergraduate students who are confident enough with the topicExport citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Emery, Nina. The Metaphysical Consequences of Counterfactual Skepticism
2015, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
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