Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: What distinguishes a conscious occurrent thought from a non-conscious occurrent thought? I argue that the notion of ‘access-consciousness’ cannot provide a satisfactory answer and that we must appeal to phenomenological properties. If this is right, a further question arises about what kind of phenomenological features are required. Can we give a satisfactory account of what makes an occurrent thought a conscious thought solely by reference to sensory phenomenology – including both verbal and non-verbal imagery? I argue that we cannot, and that we must appeal to ‘cognitive phenomenology’ in order to be able to say what distinguishes conscious occurrent thought from non-conscious occurrent thought.
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Montague, Michelle. The Life of the Mind
2015, In Paul Coates and Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
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