Diversity Reading List

This week sets the stage for a discussion of feminism and logic by revisiting the fraught relationship between feminist philosophy and the philosophical ideal of rationality.

The first paper by Longino is a helpful introduction to the main questions posed by feminist philosophers about reason and rationality in the late 20th century, including feminists’ principal objections to the “rhetoric of reason,” and their subsequent debates about whether philosophy can be redeemed. The paper provides a solid foundation for thinking further about feminist logic, and Longino concludes by proposing some interesting avenues for future research.

The first half of the second reading by Alcoff provides an accessible overview of the state of academia and feminist philosophy at the time of the Feminist Critique of Reason. It is thus helpful for understanding the cultural and philosophical context in which the first papers on feminist logic were written. The second half goes into a deeper analysis of philosophical critiques of reason at the time; it can probably be skipped over by those readers who are interested only in more contemporary debates about feminist logic.

Finally, in the further reading, originally for the New York Review of Books, Nussbaum reviews A Mind of One’s Own, a collected volume from 1993 that aimed to bring together feminists from different traditions to discuss the Feminist Critique of Reason. Nussbaum is largely critical of “non-analytical” feminists, and her review inspired heated responses from some of the contributors to the volume, as can be seen in the letters appended to the end of the review.

This week sets the stage for a discussion of feminism and logic by revisiting the fraught relationship between feminist philosophy and the philosophical ideal of rationality.

The first paper by Longino is a helpful introduction to the main questions posed by feminist philosophers about reason and rationality in the late 20th century, including feminists’ principal objections to the “rhetoric of reason,” and their subsequent debates about whether philosophy can be redeemed. The paper provides a solid foundation for thinking further about feminist logic, and Longino concludes by proposing some interesting avenues for future research.

The first half of the second reading by Alcoff provides an accessible overview of the state of academia and feminist philosophy at the time of the Feminist Critique of Reason. It is thus helpful for understanding the cultural and philosophical context in which the first papers on feminist logic were written. The second half goes into a deeper analysis of philosophical critiques of reason at the time; it can probably be skipped over by those readers who are interested only in more contemporary debates about feminist logic.

Finally, in the further reading, originally for the New York Review of Books, Nussbaum reviews A Mind of One’s Own, a collected volume from 1993 that aimed to bring together feminists from different traditions to discuss the Feminist Critique of Reason. Nussbaum is largely critical of “non-analytical” feminists, and her review inspired heated responses from some of the contributors to the volume, as can be seen in the letters appended to the end of the review.

This week focuses on Andrea Nye’s influential argument that the very idea of logic is fundamentally incompatible with feminist aims. Ironically, much of the contemporary literature on feminist logic arises as a direct reaction to Nye’s work.

Nye’s book is a largely historical work, focused on giving a revisionist, feminist history of logic from Parmenides to Frege and beyond. Her analysis of each logician’s work is original, and she argues convincingly that logical theories need to be understood as products of specific times, places, cultures, and contexts. Nye also argues (in the book’s introduction and conclusion) that this should lead us to conclude that feminism and logic are incompatible; this argument has been the subject of heated criticism by several feminist philosophers and logicians, many of whom are featured in this syllabus.

The second reading by Haas provides an extensive, if sympathetic, rebuttal of Nye’s criticism of Aristotelian logic, while at the same time emphasizing what is valuable about her critique. The rest of the chapter may also be of interest to students later in the course, after having engaged with Plumwood’s and Irigaray’s views.

Finally, Ayim’s paper is a clear and accessible articulation of the standard response by feminist logicians to Nye’s book. This text is particularly useful because, in the second half of the paper, Ayim provides a detailed example of what feminist logic and feminist logical education might look like in practice.

This week focuses on Andrea Nye’s influential argument that the very idea of logic is fundamentally incompatible with feminist aims. Ironically, much of the contemporary literature on feminist logic arises as a direct reaction to Nye’s work.

Nye’s book is a largely historical work, focused on giving a revisionist, feminist history of logic from Parmenides to Frege and beyond. Her analysis of each logician’s work is original, and she argues convincingly that logical theories need to be understood as products of specific times, places, cultures, and contexts. Nye also argues (in the book’s introduction and conclusion) that this should lead us to conclude that feminism and logic are incompatible; this argument has been the subject of heated criticism by several feminist philosophers and logicians, many of whom are featured in this syllabus.

The second reading by Haas provides an extensive, if sympathetic, rebuttal of Nye’s criticism of Aristotelian logic, while at the same time emphasizing what is valuable about her critique. The rest of the chapter may also be of interest to students later in the course, after having engaged with Plumwood’s and Irigaray’s views.

Finally, Ayim’s paper is a clear and accessible articulation of the standard response by feminist logicians to Nye’s book. This text is particularly useful because, in the second half of the paper, Ayim provides a detailed example of what feminist logic and feminist logical education might look like in practice.

This week focuses on Val Plumwood’s attempt to redirect feminist critiques of logic toward classical logic in particular, thus paving the way to a conception of feminist logic as alternative logic.

This text is a classic of feminist logic, in which Plumwood makes the groundbreaking move of proposing a revision of logic on feminist grounds. Many subsequent discussions of feminist logic take this paper as a starting point.

NB: the paper strongly overlaps with Chapter 2 of Plumwood’s Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. The paper is a bit more self-contained, but it omits Plumwood’s extended critique of postmodernist approaches.

In the second reading, Garavaso serves as a convincing objector to Plumwood’s and Nye’s positions regarding feminist logic. She focuses largely on Plumwood’s claims about classical logic and negation, first by placing them in a broader context of feminist positions on rationality, and second by conducting a deep study of Frege’s views on negation in order to show that they do not support Plumwood’s position. Garavaso then questions an assumption that seems to be held by many feminist critics of reason, namely that philosophical argumentation is comparable to deductive logic.

The third reading by Eckert and Donahue is a useful companion piece for Plumwood’s “The Politics of Reason”, in that it explains and responds to many different criticisms of Plumwood’s work.

Finally, the further reading by Plumwood elaborates on the ideas presented in “The Politics of Reason”; in particular, her perspective on negation is compared to those of other feminist theorists such as Nancy Jay and Marilyn Frye.

This week focuses on Val Plumwood’s attempt to redirect feminist critiques of logic toward classical logic in particular, thus paving the way to a conception of feminist logic as alternative logic.

This text is a classic of feminist logic, in which Plumwood makes the groundbreaking move of proposing a revision of logic on feminist grounds. Many subsequent discussions of feminist logic take this paper as a starting point.

NB: the paper strongly overlaps with Chapter 2 of Plumwood’s Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. The paper is a bit more self-contained, but it omits Plumwood’s extended critique of postmodernist approaches.

In the second reading, Garavaso serves as a convincing objector to Plumwood’s and Nye’s positions regarding feminist logic. She focuses largely on Plumwood’s claims about classical logic and negation, first by placing them in a broader context of feminist positions on rationality, and second by conducting a deep study of Frege’s views on negation in order to show that they do not support Plumwood’s position. Garavaso then questions an assumption that seems to be held by many feminist critics of reason, namely that philosophical argumentation is comparable to deductive logic.

The third reading by Eckert and Donahue is a useful companion piece for Plumwood’s “The Politics of Reason”, in that it explains and responds to many different criticisms of Plumwood’s work.

Finally, the further reading by Plumwood elaborates on the ideas presented in “The Politics of Reason”; in particular, her perspective on negation is compared to those of other feminist theorists such as Nancy Jay and Marilyn Frye.

This week discusses Luce Irigaray’s critique of identity, generality, and difference in classical logic, as showcased by its failure in expressing gender.

The first reading is an accessible introduction by Hans to Irigaray’s views on logic—particularly with respect to generality, identity, and negation—which served as inspiration for many of the foundational critiques of feminist logic in the late 20th century. In particular, she argues that formal logic is inadequate for capturing gender.

In the second reading, Irigaray presents her view of logic as the non-neutral language of science in a relatively accessible manner. It is one of the texts on which Hass bases her interpretation, and so it makes for good secondary reading.

The first further reading is another paper on which Hass bases her interpretation, where Irigaray compares the feminine to the real which is forgotten in idealized physical models. It is significantly more challenging, and some experience with Lacanian psychoanalysis is recommended.

Finally, the last further reading is a more challenging paper by Irigaray, this time focused on the inherently gendered nature of language. It can be read (in English or in the original French) by anyone hoping for a more detailed representation of Irigaray’s views on logic.

This week discusses Luce Irigaray’s critique of identity, generality, and difference in classical logic, as showcased by its failure in expressing gender.

The first reading is an accessible introduction by Hans to Irigaray’s views on logic—particularly with respect to generality, identity, and negation—which served as inspiration for many of the foundational critiques of feminist logic in the late 20th century. In particular, she argues that formal logic is inadequate for capturing gender.

In the second reading, Irigaray presents her view of logic as the non-neutral language of science in a relatively accessible manner. It is one of the texts on which Hass bases her interpretation, and so it makes for good secondary reading.

The first further reading is another paper on which Hass bases her interpretation, where Irigaray compares the feminine to the real which is forgotten in idealized physical models. It is significantly more challenging, and some experience with Lacanian psychoanalysis is recommended.

Finally, the last further reading is a more challenging paper by Irigaray, this time focused on the inherently gendered nature of language. It can be read (in English or in the original French) by anyone hoping for a more detailed representation of Irigaray’s views on logic.

This week investigates the very idea of feminist logic. Both Marjorie Hass and Gillian Russell provide several possible characterizations, and discuss their consequences for the philosophy of logic.

The first reading offers an accessible overview of feminist critiques of logic and the various possibilities for what “feminist logic” might be. It introduces some helpful distinctions—e.g., feminist criticisms of “bad logic” as compared to feminist criticisms of “logic as usual”—for making sense of the positions of thinkers such as Nye, Plumwood, and Nussbaum.

In the second reading, Russell suggests one possible argument for the possibility of feminist logic: if (like anti-exceptionalists) you believe that logic is importantly similar to science, then you might think that there is feminist logic in the same way that there is feminist science. Russell takes this argument to its natural endpoint by examining each of the possible ways that feminist logic might be understood as analogous to feminist science. This serves as a helpful introduction to the rich possibilities for feminist logicians to approach logic as anti-exceptionalists.

The further reading provides a sympathetic reading of Plumwood’s work on feminist logic, and it offers a different version of how “feminist logic” might be understood. Russell’s arguments against Plumwood are also directly addressed.

This week investigates the very idea of feminist logic. Both Marjorie Hass and Gillian Russell provide several possible characterizations, and discuss their consequences for the philosophy of logic.

The first reading offers an accessible overview of feminist critiques of logic and the various possibilities for what “feminist logic” might be. It introduces some helpful distinctions—e.g., feminist criticisms of “bad logic” as compared to feminist criticisms of “logic as usual”—for making sense of the positions of thinkers such as Nye, Plumwood, and Nussbaum.

In the second reading, Russell suggests one possible argument for the possibility of feminist logic: if (like anti-exceptionalists) you believe that logic is importantly similar to science, then you might think that there is feminist logic in the same way that there is feminist science. Russell takes this argument to its natural endpoint by examining each of the possible ways that feminist logic might be understood as analogous to feminist science. This serves as a helpful introduction to the rich possibilities for feminist logicians to approach logic as anti-exceptionalists.

The further reading provides a sympathetic reading of Plumwood’s work on feminist logic, and it offers a different version of how “feminist logic” might be understood. Russell’s arguments against Plumwood are also directly addressed.

This week discusses a possible path from feminist science to feminist logic: feminist perspectives on science may suggest revision, and on Quinean grounds, those revisions may go up to logic itself. Lynn Hankinson Nelson & Jack Nelson spell out the theoretical argument, while Andrea Nye discusses a particularly promising example from biology.

Drawing from biology, the first reading provides an explicit example of how the work of feminist scientists might suggest a revision of our logic. In the second reading, Hankinson Nelson & Nelson provide a useful and accessible summary of Quine’s views on the empirical revision of science and logic, thus setting the stage for a view that allows for the revision of logic on feminist grounds. This paper thus serves as a helpful theoretical basis for the argument in Nye’s paper on predicate logic and natural kinds.

This week discusses a possible path from feminist science to feminist logic: feminist perspectives on science may suggest revision, and on Quinean grounds, those revisions may go up to logic itself. Lynn Hankinson Nelson & Jack Nelson spell out the theoretical argument, while Andrea Nye discusses a particularly promising example from biology.

Drawing from biology, the first reading provides an explicit example of how the work of feminist scientists might suggest a revision of our logic. In the second reading, Hankinson Nelson & Nelson provide a useful and accessible summary of Quine’s views on the empirical revision of science and logic, thus setting the stage for a view that allows for the revision of logic on feminist grounds. This paper thus serves as a helpful theoretical basis for the argument in Nye’s paper on predicate logic and natural kinds.

This week focuses on the idea of feminist logic qua logic of gender. Several contemporary gender models are compared: while Helen Daly’s “folklore” models implicitly rely on classical dichotomies, Maureen Eckert argues that nonclassical logics can do a better job.

The first reading by Daly offers an accessible overview of (classical) folk gender models, what they get right, and where they go wrong.

In the second paper by Eckert, readers are given a nice example of how certain nonclassical logics have an advantage over classical logic when it comes to modelling gender. Some important shortcomings of Plumwood’s methods are also examined.

The further reading by Collins discusses certain advantages of nonclassical logics (this time, fuzzy logic) over classical logic for modelling gender. The proposed model is compared to Daly’s above.

This week focuses on the idea of feminist logic qua logic of gender. Several contemporary gender models are compared: while Helen Daly’s “folklore” models implicitly rely on classical dichotomies, Maureen Eckert argues that nonclassical logics can do a better job.

The first reading by Daly offers an accessible overview of (classical) folk gender models, what they get right, and where they go wrong.

In the second paper by Eckert, readers are given a nice example of how certain nonclassical logics have an advantage over classical logic when it comes to modelling gender. Some important shortcomings of Plumwood’s methods are also examined.

The further reading by Collins discusses certain advantages of nonclassical logics (this time, fuzzy logic) over classical logic for modelling gender. The proposed model is compared to Daly’s above.

This week shows how formal logic may be used in pursuing feminist aims by looking at two particular applications: Gillian Russell’s modelling of “social spheres” and Catharine Saint-Croix’s modelling of epistemic standpoints.

The first reading by Russell is an example of how feminist concerns might drive research in logic, in this case by suggesting a new kind of quantifier aimed at representing subordinating speech. The final part of the paper is also notable for its discussion of the value of formal logic in feminist theorizing.

The second reading by Saint-Croix is an example of how formal logic could be useful for feminist epistemologists. It contains an extensive introduction to standpoint theory and its history, and formal elements are introduced with many examples and informal discussion.

The further reading presents a variation of Saint-Croix’s framework from above, focused on capturing the epistemic stances of activists.

This week shows how formal logic may be used in pursuing feminist aims by looking at two particular applications: Gillian Russell’s modelling of “social spheres” and Catharine Saint-Croix’s modelling of epistemic standpoints.

The first reading by Russell is an example of how feminist concerns might drive research in logic, in this case by suggesting a new kind of quantifier aimed at representing subordinating speech. The final part of the paper is also notable for its discussion of the value of formal logic in feminist theorizing.

The second reading by Saint-Croix is an example of how formal logic could be useful for feminist epistemologists. It contains an extensive introduction to standpoint theory and its history, and formal elements are introduced with many examples and informal discussion.

The further reading presents a variation of Saint-Croix’s framework from above, focused on capturing the epistemic stances of activists.

This week explores the idea of finding feminist logic in the history of logic via three examples: John Dewey’s pragmatist logic, Stoic logic as a logic of sense, and Aristotelian negation.

In the first reading, Guen Hart interprets Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) as a theory of logic that could reasonably be described as feminist, in part due to its pragmatist perspective. This serves as a nice demonstration of what a feminist philosophical (re-)appropriation of logic might look like—though Guen Hart doesn’t go much further than restating and explaining Dewey’s views in great detail.

In the second reading, Olkowski offers a substantial contribution to the feminist-logic conversation by linking Nye’s criticisms of logic with the views of Merlau-Ponty and Deleuze on language. She then proposes that these criticisms can be addressed by Stoic logic, which makes room for “perception and reflection” in logic. The paper provides detailed overviews of these different positions, but it can be difficult to navigate as an introductory text.

Finally, in the third reading, Hass not only defends Aristotelian logic from Nye’s onslaught, but also argues that Aristotelian negation – as opposed to Fregean negation – may in fact be the first step of an answer to Plumwood’s and Irigaray’s concerns.

This week explores the idea of finding feminist logic in the history of logic via three examples: John Dewey’s pragmatist logic, Stoic logic as a logic of sense, and Aristotelian negation.

In the first reading, Guen Hart interprets Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) as a theory of logic that could reasonably be described as feminist, in part due to its pragmatist perspective. This serves as a nice demonstration of what a feminist philosophical (re-)appropriation of logic might look like—though Guen Hart doesn’t go much further than restating and explaining Dewey’s views in great detail.

In the second reading, Olkowski offers a substantial contribution to the feminist-logic conversation by linking Nye’s criticisms of logic with the views of Merlau-Ponty and Deleuze on language. She then proposes that these criticisms can be addressed by Stoic logic, which makes room for “perception and reflection” in logic. The paper provides detailed overviews of these different positions, but it can be difficult to navigate as an introductory text.

Finally, in the third reading, Hass not only defends Aristotelian logic from Nye’s onslaught, but also argues that Aristotelian negation – as opposed to Fregean negation – may in fact be the first step of an answer to Plumwood’s and Irigaray’s concerns.

This week explores the relationship between feminism and logical pluralism. Audrey Yap’s suggestion that feminism could benefit from a Carnapian perspective on logic is compared to Roy Cook’s suggestion that feminist logic may instantiate a form of pluralism connected to agents.

In the first reading, Yap suggests a possible connection between Carnap’s version of logical pluralism and the goals of feminist philosophy. Basic familiarity with logical empiricism may be helpful for understanding the discussion.

The second reading identifies a largely untapped version of logical pluralism, which connects different logics with different kinds of agents; this is taken to be supported by the idea of standpoint epistemology, in the sense that different marginalized groups may be associated with different logics. The paper also serves as a general overview of varieties of logical pluralism.

In the last reading, Yap elaborates on the connection between feminists’ goals and Carnap’s views on logic, and she applies her conclusions to the contemporary debate on the meaning of “woman”.

This week explores the relationship between feminism and logical pluralism. Audrey Yap’s suggestion that feminism could benefit from a Carnapian perspective on logic is compared to Roy Cook’s suggestion that feminist logic may instantiate a form of pluralism connected to agents.

In the first reading, Yap suggests a possible connection between Carnap’s version of logical pluralism and the goals of feminist philosophy. Basic familiarity with logical empiricism may be helpful for understanding the discussion.

The second reading identifies a largely untapped version of logical pluralism, which connects different logics with different kinds of agents; this is taken to be supported by the idea of standpoint epistemology, in the sense that different marginalized groups may be associated with different logics. The paper also serves as a general overview of varieties of logical pluralism.

In the last reading, Yap elaborates on the connection between feminists’ goals and Carnap’s views on logic, and she applies her conclusions to the contemporary debate on the meaning of “woman”.

This week focuses on connections between Western feminist critiques of logic on one hand, and Native American logic on the other.

The first reading by Waters is an introduction to dynamic, non-dualistic Indigenous metaphysics, with a focus on the concept of gender. It is one of the main texts referenced in Eichler’s discussion of Native American logic.

The second reading by Eichler is not only an accessible introduction to some common themes in Native American logic and metaphysics, but it also points to how such logics differ from classical logic precisely where feminist critiques tend to find classical logic problematic. It also provides some pointers as to how Western feminists may respectfully navigate this territory.

Finally, Sinclair’s paper focuses on the “paraconsistency” of Indigenous logics and elaborates on Eichler’s suggestion that feminists have much to gain from these logics by looking at a particular example from biology. 

This week focuses on connections between Western feminist critiques of logic on one hand, and Native American logic on the other.

The first reading by Waters is an introduction to dynamic, non-dualistic Indigenous metaphysics, with a focus on the concept of gender. It is one of the main texts referenced in Eichler’s discussion of Native American logic.

The second reading by Eichler is not only an accessible introduction to some common themes in Native American logic and metaphysics, but it also points to how such logics differ from classical logic precisely where feminist critiques tend to find classical logic problematic. It also provides some pointers as to how Western feminists may respectfully navigate this territory.

Finally, Sinclair’s paper focuses on the “paraconsistency” of Indigenous logics and elaborates on Eichler’s suggestion that feminists have much to gain from these logics by looking at a particular example from biology. 

This week explores ways in which feminist critiques of logic can extend to critiques of mathematics, and what this could mean for the philosophy and practice of mathematics.

The first reading is an early attempt to bring feminist critiques of logic and science to bear specifically on mathematics, arguing that the choice of axioms and definitions, not to mention what constitutes a proof, is not value-free.

The second reading argues that Plumwood’s feminist arguments against classical logic also apply to classical mathematics. Different possible solutions are compared, making it ideal for discussion. Sections 3 and 4 argue that another kind of argument against classical logic fails to carry over; they can be skipped for the purpose of this reading group. No familiarity with university-level maths or the philosophy of maths is required.

This week explores ways in which feminist critiques of logic can extend to critiques of mathematics, and what this could mean for the philosophy and practice of mathematics.

The first reading is an early attempt to bring feminist critiques of logic and science to bear specifically on mathematics, arguing that the choice of axioms and definitions, not to mention what constitutes a proof, is not value-free.

The second reading argues that Plumwood’s feminist arguments against classical logic also apply to classical mathematics. Different possible solutions are compared, making it ideal for discussion. Sections 3 and 4 argue that another kind of argument against classical logic fails to carry over; they can be skipped for the purpose of this reading group. No familiarity with university-level maths or the philosophy of maths is required.