The Given – Diversity Reading List

2017, Topoi 36(4): 651-656.

Categories: Epistemic Regress, Epistemological States and Properties, Epistemology, Foundationalism and Coherentism, Justification, Metaphysics & Epistemology, Perception, Perceptual Knowledge, Philosophy of Mind, The Given

Keywords: divine freedom, incompatibilism, philosophy of religion

Expand entry: Added by: Emily Paul

Abstract: In 'Divine Freedom,' I argue that morally significant incompatibilist freedom is a great good. So God possesses morally incompatibilist freedom. So, God can do wrong or at least can do worse than the best action He can do. So, God is not essentially morally perfect. After careful consideration of numerous objections, I conclude that this argument is undefeated.

Comment: Useful for a unit on divine freedom with an intermediate level Philosophy of Religion course - would suit as the primary reading for this, as it gives a great overview and is relatively short, and also presents the central arguments in the debate over divine freedom: the alleged tension between incompatibilist freedom, and the thought that God always chooses the best possible action. It could be good to spend a whole seminar discussing how this tension is created, why it's problematic, and whether it can be resolved.

Difficulty: Easy-Intermediate

Recommended use: Introductory with overview

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