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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Lizzy VenthamAbstract: I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.Comment: I find this paper to be a valuable addition to classes on implicit biases, reasons, and moral psychology. It provides a good basis for discussion on how these topics relate to free will, and what sorts of control (and responsibilities) we have over our mental lives - including our desires, our beliefs, and other thoughts.
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Added by: Petronella Randell
Abstract: What happens when we consider transformative experiences from the perspective of gender transitions? In this paper I suggest that at least two insights emerge. First, trans* persons’ experiences of gender transitions show some limitations to L. A. Paul’s (2015) decision theoretic account of transformative decisions. This will involve exploring some of the phenomenology of coming to know that one is trans, and in coming to decide to transition. Second, what epistemological effects are there to undergoing a transformative experience? By connecting some experiences of gender transitions to feminist standpoint epistemology, I argue that radical changes in one’s identity and social location also radically affects one’s access to knowledge in ways not widely appreciated in contemporary epistemology.
Comment: This paper would work well as an additional reading on a week about transformative experience, particularly on a module which includes feminist philosophy. The paper argues that the choice to transition can be made rationally, despite this decision being a transformative decision.
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Added by: Petronella Randell
Abstract: I want to focus on some of the limits of decision theory that are of interest to the philosophical concern with practical reasoning and rational choice. These limits should also be of interest to the social-scientists’ concern with Rational Choice.
Comment: Ullmann-Margalit's work on big decisions is a significant precursor to L.A. Paul's work on transformative experience. This paper introduces the idea of big decisions as a problem for decision theory, and would be suitable as the essential or further reading on a week discussing challenges to decision theory, rational choice, or on transformative experience.