Longino, Helen. Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy
1996 1996, In Feminism, science, and the philosophy of science, Lynn Hankinson Nelson and Jack Nelson (Eds.) (pp. 39-58). Springer, Dordrecht.
Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Patricia Rich
Abstract: Underdetermination arguments support the conclusion that no amount of empirical data can uniquely determine theory choice. The full content of a theory outreaches those elements of it (the observational elements) that can be shown to be true (or in agreement with actual observations).2 A number of strategies have been developed to minimize the threat such arguments pose to our aspirations to scientific knowledge. I want to focus on one such strategy: the invocation of additional criteria drawn from a pool of cognitive or theoretical values, such as simplicity or gen- erality, to bolster judgements about the worth of models, theories, and hypotheses. What is the status of such criteria? Larry Laudan, in Science and Values, argued that cognitive values could not be treated as self-validating, beyond justification, but are embedded in a three-way reticulational system containing theories, methods, and aims or values, which are involved in mutually supportive relation- ships (Laudan, 1984). My interest in this paper is not the purportedly self- validating nature of cognitive values, but their cognitive nature. Although Laudan rejects the idea that what he calls cognitive values are exempt from rational critic- ism and disagreement, he does seem to think that the reticulational system he identifies is independent of non-cognitive considerations. It is this cognitive/ non-cognitive distinction that I wish to query in this paper. Let me begin by summarizing those of my own views about inquiry in which this worry about the distinction arises.
Comment: This is a useful text discussing values in science, including clear definitions and examples, which also takes a feminist perspective on the application of values. It doesn't require very special background knowledge, but general familiarity with philosophy of science or science itself would be useful. It could fit in a variety of philosophy of science courses.