Egan, Frances. Computational models: a modest role for content
2010, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41(3): 253-259.
Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.
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Comment: Good paper about the relation of representation and content to computation. Best suited to higher-level courses on the subject.