Back matter: This book explores the epistemic or knowledge requirement of moral responsibility. Haji argues that an agent can be blamed (or praised) only if the agent harbors a belief that the action in question is wrong (or right or obligatory). Defending the importance of an “authenticity” condition when evaluating moral responsibility, Haji holds that one cannot be morally responsible for an action unless the action issues from sources (like desires or beliefs) that are truly the agent’s own. Engaging crucial arguments in moral theory to elaborate his views on moral responsibility, Haji addresses as well fascinating, underexamined topics such as assigning blame across an intercultural gap and the relevance of unconscious or dream thoughts when evaluating responsibility.
Euthanasia
Synopsis generated from the paper: Foot argues that euthanasia is not a merely quiet or easy death. An act of euthanasia, including a deliberate omission, is a choice of another person’s death for that person’s own sake, because life is no longer a good for them. Life is normally a benefit even when it contains much pain, handicap, or unhappiness, but the connection between life and good breaks when a life no longer contains a minimum of ordinary human goods, as in some extreme illness, or when consciousness has sunk so low that life is neither a good nor, unless there is suffering, an evil. Foot then asks when such acts are morally permissible. She distinguishes justice, which concerns rights, from charity, which concerns the good of others, and she separates active from passive and voluntary from nonvoluntary euthanasia. Nonvoluntary active euthanasia is never justified, because the right to life includes a duty of noninterference that is not cancelled by the judgment that someone would be better off dead. Nonvoluntary passive euthanasia is not ruled out by that duty, except where a special right to life-preserving service exists, for instance under a doctor’s contract. Voluntary euthanasia, active or passive, need not infringe rights if the person has waived them. Where justice does not forbid the act, charity generally speaks in favor of it, since the aim is the good of the one who dies, though a wish to die is not itself proof that death is for their good. In practice, Foot notes that withholding life-prolonging treatment is already common. Allowing infants with Down’s syndrome to die because they burden others is not euthanasia in her sense. She supports something like a living will for previously expressed wishes, but warns against legalizing active euthanasia: it is open to abuse, and in a rich society it could erode the expectation that the old and the ill will be looked after.
The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect
Introduction: One of the reasons why most of us feel puzzled about the problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults and children. When we think of a baby about to be born it seems absurd to think that the next few minutes or even hours could make so radical a difference to its status; yet as we go back in the life of the foetus we are more and more reluctant to say that this is a human being and must be treated as such. No doubt this is the deepest source of our dilemma, but it is not the only one. For we are also confused about the general question of what we may and may not do where the interests of human beings conflict. We have strong intuitions about certain cases; saying, for instance, that it is all right to raise the level of education in our country, though statistics allow us to predict that a rise in the suicide rate will follow, while it is not all right to kill the feeble-minded to aid cancer research. It is not easy, however, to see the principles involved, and one way of throwing light on the abortion issue will be by setting up parallels involving adults or children once born. So we will be able to isolate the ‘equal rights’ issue and should be able to make some advance.
Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason – Introduction
Back matter: Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.
Genetic Engineering and Autonomous Agency
Abstract: In this paper I argue that the genetic manipulation of sexual orientation at the embryo stage could have a detrimental effect on the subsequent person’s later capacity for autonomous agency. By focussing on an example of sexist oppression I show that the norms and expectations expressed with this type of genetic manipulation can threaten the development of autonomous agency and the kind of social environment that makes its exercise likely.
Gender and the Metric of Justice
Content: A relatively short but very illuminating discussion of the application of two key metrics (social primary goods and capabilities) to the issue of gender injustice in non-ideal circumstances.
How to Include the Severly Disabled in a Contractarian Theory of Justice
Content: Modifies and then defends a Rawlsian theory of justice from the charge that it cannot adequately account for the claims of severely disabled individuals who cannot participate fully in schemes of cooperation.
At the Margins of Moral Personhood
Summary: Considers the particular case of CSMR individuals in detail and makes a strong case for incorporating relational elements into an account of moral personhood.
What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?
Abstract: Most agree that when it comes to so-called ‘first-order’ normative ethics and political philosophy, constructivist views are a powerful family of positions. When it comes to metaethics, however, there is serious disagreement about what, if anything, constructivism has to contribute. In this paper I argue that constructivist views in ethics include not just a family of substantive normative positions, but also a distinct and highly attractive metaethical view. I argue that the widely accepted ‘proceduralist characterization’ of constructivism in ethics is inadequate, and I propose what I call the ‘practical standpoint characterization’ in its place. I then offer a general taxonomy of constructivist positions in ethics. Since constructivism’s standing as a family of substantive normative positions is relatively uncontested, I devote the remainder of the paper to addressing skeptics’ worries about the distinctiveness of constructivism understood as a metaethical view. I compare and contrast constructivism with three other standard metaethical positions with which it is often confused or mistakenly thought to be compatible: realism; naturalist reductions in terms of an ideal response; and expressivism. In discussing the contrast with expressivism, I explain the sense in which, according to the constructivist, the distinction between substantive normative ethics and metaethics breaks down. I conclude by distinguishing between two importantly different debates about the mind-dependence of value. I argue that a failure to make this distinction is part of what explains why the possibility of constructivism as a metaethical view is often overlooked.