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Added by: Björn Freter, Contributed by: Joe Slater
Abstract: David Lewis famously argued that the time traveller ‘can’ murder her grandfather, even though she never will: it is compossible with a particular set of facts including her motive, opportunity and skill (1976: 150). I argue that while ordinary agents ‘can’ under Lewis’s conception, philosophers cannot – the latter will not only fail to fulfill their homicidal intentions but also fail to form them in the first place.
Paul, L. A., Hall, Edward J. (Hall, Ned). Causation: A User’s Guide2013, Oxford University Press UK.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Tyron Goldschmidt
Publisher's Note: Causation is at once familiar and mysterious. Neither common sense nor extensive philosophical debate has led us to anything like agreement on the correct analysis of the concept of causation, or an account of the metaphysical nature of the causal relation. Causation: A User's Guide cuts a clear path through this confusing but vital landscape. L. A. Paul and Ned Hall guide the reader through the most important philosophical treatments of causation, negotiating the terrain by taking a set of examples as landmarks. They clarify the central themes of the debate about causation, and cover questions about causation involving omissions or absences, preemption and other species of redundant causation, and the possibility that causation is not transitive. Along the way, Paul and Hall examine several contemporary proposals for analyzing the nature of causation and assess their merits and overall methodological cogency.The book is designed to be of value both to trained specialists and those coming to the problem of causation for the first time. It provides the reader with a broad and sophisticated view of the metaphysics of the causal relation.Comment: An excellent overview of the debate on causation which would work well in any undergraduate or postgraduate metaphysics course which covered causation.
Lewis, David, Stephanie Lewis. Holes1970,-
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Added by: Clotilde TorregrossaAbstract:
Comment: This is an accessible resource which works well to introduce various issues in ontology and meta-ontology in an engaging way. Would work well in an undergraduate course on metaphysics or ontology, or as introductory reading for a graduate level course on metaphysics or ontology.
Ismael, Jenann. Raid! Dissolving the Big, Bad Bug2008, Nous 42 (2): 292--307-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Antony Eagle
Abstract: There's a long history of discussion of probability in philosophy, but objective chance separated itself off and came into its own as a topic with the advent of a physical theory—quantum mechanics—in which chances play a central, and apparently ineliminable, role. In 1980 David Lewis wrote a paper pointing out that a very broad class of accounts of the nature of chance apparently lead to a contradiction when combined with a principle that expresses the role of chance in guiding belief. There is still no settled agreement on the proper response to the Lewis problem. At the time he wrote the article, Lewis despaired of a solution, but, although he never achieved one that satisfied him completely, by 1994, due to work primarily by Thau and Hall, he had come to think the problem could be disarmed if we fudged a little on the meaning of 'chance'. I'll say more about this below. What I'm going to suggest, however, is that the qualification is unnecessary. The problem depends on an assumption that should be rejected, viz., that using information about chance to guide credence requires one to conditionalize on the theory of chance that one is using. I'm going to propose a general recipe for using information about chance to guide belief that does not require conditionalization on a theory of chance at any stage. Lewis' problem doesn't arise in this setting.Comment: A useful summary and positive contribution to the large debate over Lewis' Principal Principle connecting chance and credence. Useful for a graduate seminar in philosophy of probability or specialised topics in metaphysics and philosophy of physics.
Choi, Shungho. The Conditional Analysis of dispositions and the intrinsic dispositions thesis2009, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(3): 568-590.-
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Abstract: The idea that dispositions are an intrinsic matter has been popular among contemporary philosophers of dispositions. This paper first states this idea as exactly as possible. Then it examines whether it poses any threat to the two current versions of the conditional analysis of dispositions, namely, the simple and reformed conditional analysis of dispositions. The upshot is that the intrinsic nature of dispositions, when properly understood, doesn't spell trouble for either of the two versions of the conditional analysis of dispositions. Along the way,the author proposes an extensionally correct and practically useful criterion for identifying nomically intrinsic dispositions and criticizes one objection raised by Lewis against the simple conditional analysis of dispositions.Comment: The article explains the different views about the connection between dispositions and counterfactual conditionals. It could be useful for senior undergraduates or for postgraduates interested in the metaphysics of conditional analyses.
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Rennick, Stephanie. Things mere mortals can do, but philosophers can’t
2015, Analysis 75(1): 22-26
Comment: If one is teaching the grandfather paradox, this is a great reading to use. It's short, clearly written and nicely conveys tensions associated with the paradox.