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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
¿Seguimos reglas de inferencia al razonar? Por más intuitiva que resulte la respuesta positiva a esta pregunta, hay una serie de dificultades para vincular reglas lógicas y prácticas inferenciales. El Problema de la Adopción de Reglas de Inferencia constituye un desafío para todo aquel que proponga que podemos seguir nuevos patrones inferenciales a partir del reconocimiento de reglas. En esta sección temática se exploran diversos asuntos conectados a si podemos seguir un nuevo patrón inferencial en virtud de una regla.
Birman, Romina. The Adoption Problem and the Epistemology of Logic2023, Mind, 133(529): 37-60-
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
After introducing the adoption problem (AP) as the claim that certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted, I offer a characterization of this notion as a two-phase process consisting in (1) the acceptance of a basic logical principle, and (2) the development, in virtue of Phase 1, of a practice of inferring in accordance with that principle. The case of a subject who does not infer in accordance with universal instantiation is considered in detail. I argue that the AP has deep and wide implications for the epistemology of logic, extending well beyond Kripke’s original target, viz. Putnam’s proposal for the empirical revision of logic and its background Quinean epistemology. In particular, the AP questions whether basic logical principles could have a fundamental role in our inferential practices, drawing our attention to the nature of basic inferences and the need to have a clearer conception of them before taking a stand on the matter of the epistemic justification of the logical principles.
Comment: This paper can be presented to students as an authoritative and accessible introduction to the so-called Adoption Problem in the philosophy of logic. It sets the stage for further more advanced readings on the topic.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. Logical Conventionalism and the Adoption Problem2023, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 97(1), pp. 47–81-
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
Abstract: In this paper, I take issue with a core commitment of logical conventionalism: that we impose a logic on ourselves by adopting general linguistic conventions governing our use of logical terms, thereby determining the meanings of the logical constants and which of our inferences are valid. Drawing on Kripke’s ‘adoption problem’, I argue that general logical principles cannot be adopted, either explicitly or implicitly. I go on to argue that the meanings of our logical terms, and the validity of our inferences, cannot depend on our adoption of logico-linguistic conventions.
Comment: Although this paper includes an argument against logical conventionalism (which is in itself interesting), it is also a helpfully clear overview of the so-called Adoption Problem in the philosophy of logic, and can be thus be featured as part of a course on contemporary issues in the epistemology of logic.
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Padró, Barrio, Eduardo A.. El problema de la adopción de reglas lógicas
2022, Análisis Filosófico, 42(1): 33-42.
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Comment: This is a clear, Spanish-language introduction to the so-called Adoption Problem in the philosophy of logic.