Zagzebski, Linda. The Search for the Source of the Epistemic Good
2003, Metaphilosophy 34(1-2): 12-28.
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Added by: Jie Gao, Contributed by: Wayne Riggs
Abstract: Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this "the value problem." I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p, not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: What makes knowingp better than merely truly believing p? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life.Zagzebski, Linda. Epistemic Value and the Primacy of What We Care About2004, Philosophical Papers 33(3): 353-377.-
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Added by: Rie Iizuka, Contributed by: Wayne Riggs
Abstract: In this paper I argue that to understand the ethics of belief we need to put it in a context of what we care about. Epistemic values always arise from something we care about and they arise only from something we care about. It is caring that gives rise to the demand to be epistemically conscientious. The reason morality puts epistemic demands on us is that we care about morality. But there may be a (small) class of beliefs which it is not wrong to hold unconscientiously. I also argue that epistemic values enjoy a privileged place in the panorama of what we care about because they are entailed by anything we care about. That means that when there is a conflict between caring about knowledge or true belief and caring about something else, that conflict cannot be resolved simply by following the one we care about the most because caring about knowledge in any domain is entailed by caring about that domain. Finally, I argue that whereas caring demands different degrees of conscientiousness in different contexts, contextualism about knowledge is less plausible.Comment: An interesting paper on the concept of care in virtue epistemology. This paper might be useful in the course of virtue epistemology or philosophy of care.
Zagzebski, Linda. What is Knowledge?1999, in John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.) The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell)): 92-116.-
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Added by: Emily Paul, Contributed by: Wayne Riggs
Summary: This chapter is an analysis of propositional knowledge, including how we are to define it, focusing on 'justified true belief' and Gettier objections. It concludes with a definition of knowledge as 'an act of intellectual virtue', drawing on virtue ethics. Zagzebski then defends this definition.Comment: Very useful as an introduction to an introductory course on Epistemology. Sets the scene really well by introducing the concept of knowledge, and different kinds of knowledge and Gettier cases. For this reason, it would make a great first reading on an introductory epistemology module.
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Comment: This paper nicely elucidates different respects of the value problem about knowledge and enriches the debate by bringing multiple resources and perspectives into consideration, such as the agency of the knower and the wider value of good life. It is good for teachings on epistemic values in an epistemology course at either an advanced or introductory level.