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Added by: Carl Fox
Abstract: Are inequalities of income created by the free market just? In this book Serena Olsaretti examines two main arguments that justify those inequalities: the first claims that they are just because they are deserved, and the second claims that they are just because they are what free individuals are entitled to. Both these arguments purport to show, in different ways, that giving responsible individuals their due requires that free market inequalities in incomes be allowed. Olsaretti argues, however, that neither argument is successful, and shows that when we examine closely the principle of desert and the notions of liberty and choice invoked by defenders of the free market, it appears that a conception of justice that would accommodate these notions, far from supporting free market inequalities, calls for their elimination. Her book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in political philosophy, political theory and normative economics.Olsaretti, Serena. Freedom, Force and Choice: Against the Rights-Based Definition of Voluntariness1998, Journal of Political Philosophy 6(1): 53-78.-
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Added by: Carl Fox
Introduction: This paper argues that a moralised definition of voluntariness, alongside the more familiar moralised definition of freedom, underlies libertarian justifications of the unbridled market. Through an analysis of Nozick's account of voluntary choice, I intend to reveal some fatal mistakes, and to put forward some suggestions regarding what a satisfactory account of voluntary choice requires.Comment: Offers a number of influential criticisms of Nozickian libertarianism and goes on to lay out the basis for Olsaretti's own influential account of voluntariness. Would make a good required reading or further reading.
Pateman, Carole. Democratizing Citizenship: Some Advantages of a Basic Income2004, Politics and Society 32 (1):89-105-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
If the focus of interest is democratization, including women’s freedom, a basic income is preferable to stakeholding. Prevailing theoretical approaches and conceptions of individual freedom, free-riding seen as a problem of men’s employment, and neglect of feminist insights obscure the democratic potential of a basic income. An argument in terms of individual freedom as self-government, a basic income as a democratic right, and the importance of the opportunity not to be employed shows how a basic income can help break both the link between income and employment and the mutual reinforcement of the institutions of marriage, employment, and citizenship.
Comment: This paper explores questions as the intersection of feminism and the basic income literature, offering one of the central cases made in support of basic income by feminists: that a basic income, especially with compared with other forms of stakeholding, has the potential to advance democratization more generally, and women's freedom specifically, by breaking the "long-standing link between income and employment, and end(ing) the mutual reinforcement of the institutions of marriage, employment, and citizenship." The author shows why basic income is preferrable to stakeholding with these goals in mind. The paper would therefore be interesting to discuss in relation to feminist politics or a survey of the basic income literature, especially assigned in tandem with some of the literature treated as UBI canon or core, such as Phillipe Van Parijs' work.
Vredenburgh, Kate. Freedom at Work: Understanding, Alienation, and the AI-Driven Workplace2022, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):78-92.-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This paper explores a neglected normative dimension of algorithmic opacity in the workplace and the labor market. It argues that explanations of algorithms and algorithmic decisions are of noninstrumental value. That is because explanations of the structure and function of parts of the social world form the basis for reflective clarification of our practical orientation toward the institutions that play a central role in our life. Using this account of the noninstrumental value of explanations, the paper diagnoses distinctive normative defects in the workplace and economic institutions which a reliance on AI can encourage, and which lead to alienation.
Comment: This paper offers a novel approach to the exploration of alienation at work (i.e., what makes work bad) from an algorithmic ethics perspective. It relies on the noninstrumental value of explanation to make its central argument, and grounds this value in the role that explanation plays in our ability to form a practical orientation towards our scoial world. In this sense, it examines an interesting, and somewhat underexplored, connection between algorithmic ethics, justice, the future of work, and social capabilities. As such, it could be useful in a wide range of course contexts. This being said, the central argument is fairly complex, and relies on some previous understanding of analytic political philosophy and philosophy of AI. It also employs technical language from these domains, and therefore would be best utilised for masters-level or other advanced philosophical courses and study.
Wolf, Susan. Asymmetrical freedom1980, Journal of Philosophy 77(3): 151-166.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Diversifying Syllabi: Thesis: interesting and sophisticated position compatibilist position in the debate about free will and determinism. Slogan: To be free is to be determined by the Good. The claim is that if we do the right thing for the right reasons, then we are free – in the sense that is required by moral responsibility – even if we are determined. But if we do the wrong thing, then we are free and morally responsible only if we are not determined (i.e. if we could have done otherwise).Comment: This text offers an interesting discussion of the issue of free will and determinism, and its relation to moral responsibility. It is best used in teaching metaphysics and moral philosophy classes on those topics. It offers some review of the debate, but is not general enough to be used as an introduction. It can also be used in more specific classes in ethics, focusing on moral luck or blameworthiness.
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Olsaretti, Serena. Liberty, Desert and the Market: A Philosophical Study
2004, Cambridge University Press.
Comment: Attacks libertarian defences of market distributions on the grounds that they are either justified or the result of free choices. Provides a good counterpoint to Nozick's entitlement theory in particular, and draws out important issues on the relationship between choice, voluntariness, and responsibility. Olsaretti's own account of voluntariness, which she develops in the later chapters is hugely influential. Would make good reading for an in-depth treatment of libertarianism and/or Nozick's entitlement theory. Would also provide very substantial further reading.