Beebee, Helen. Necessary Connections and the Problem of Induction
2011, Noûs 45(3): 504-527.
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Summary: In this paper Beebee argues that the problem of induction, which she describes as a genuine sceptical problem, is the same for Humeans than for Necessitarians. Neither scientific essentialists nor Armstrong can solve the problem of induction by appealing to IBE (Inference to the Best Explanation), for both arguments take an illicit inductive step.Comment : This paper describes in a comprehensible way Armstrong's and the Humean approaches to the problem of induction. Ideal for postgraduate philosophy of science courses, although it could be a further reading for undergraduate courses as well.Spencer, Quayshawn. Do Newton’s Rules of Reasoning Guarantee Truth … Must They?2004, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 35(4): 759-782.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Newton's Principia introduces four rules of reasoning for natural philosophy. Although useful, there is a concern about whether Newton's rules guarantee truth. After redirecting the discussion from truth to validity, I show that these rules are valid insofar as they fulfill Goodman's criteria for inductive rules and Newton's own methodological program of experimental philosophy; provided that cross-checks are used prior to applications of rule 4 and immediately after applications of rule 2 the following activities are pursued: (1) research addressing observations that systematically deviate from theoretical idealizations and (2) applications of theory that safeguard ongoing research from proceeding down a garden path.Comment : A good examination of the relationship of scientific practices to truth, put in a historical context. Would be useful in a history and philosophy of science course.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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