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, Contributed by: Marilou NieddaAbstract:
In this chapter, I draw on the seminal work of feminist theorist Iris Marion Young to consider how political responses to structural injustice, exacerbated by AI,¹ might be developed. My interpretation of Young’s work is centred on what I see as an overlooked feature of her account of structural injustice - ‘untraceability’. Drawing on Arendt’s concept of ‘thoughtlessness’ and the work of other scholars such as Benjamin, I explore the relationship between structural injustice and algorithmic decision making,² which, itself, is becoming increasingly untraceable. I argue that while fault-based regulation of AI is vital for combating injustice exacerbated by AI, too little thought goes into addressing the structural dynamics of AI’s impact on society which requires a different sort of approach. I conclude by offering some suggestions on how we might think about mitigating the exacerbation of structural injustice posed by AI. In particular, I advocate adopting several elements of the mini-public approach within the regulatory public-body landscape of democratic governance systems to form a new ‘AI Public Body’ (using the UK as my example).Comment: On the one hand, this book chapter is useful for introducing the concept of structural injustice to students by examining the (un)traceable responsibility that individuals bear when they unconsciously (re)produce structural inequities. The text is fairly easy to read, especially to apprehend such a central concept in feminist theory of justice. On the other hand, Browne applies her understanding of traceable liability to AI technologies, which is an application that students can understand quite well. It also brings about a social perspective in the philosophy of AI.
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Added by: Rochelle DuFordAbstract: The essay theorizes the responsibilities moral agents may be said to have in relation to global structural social processes that have unjust consequences. How ought moral agents, whether individual or institutional, conceptualize their responsibilities in relation to global injustice? I propose a model of responsibility from social connection as an interpretation of obligations of justice arising from structural social processes. I use the example of justice in transnational processes of production, distribution and marketing of clothing to illustrate operations of structural social processes that extend widely across regions of the world. The social connection model of responsibility says that all agents who contribute by their actions to the structural processes that produce injustice have responsibilities to work to remedy these injustices. I distinguish this model from a more standard model of responsibility, which I call a liability model. I specify five features of the social connection model of responsibility that distinguish it from the liability model: it does not isolate perpetrators; it judges background conditions of action; it is more forward looking than backward looking; its responsibility is essentially shared; and it can be discharged only through collective action. The final section of the essay begins to articulate parameters of reasoning that agents can use for thinking about their own action in relation to structural injusticeComment: This text responds to theories of individual responsibility for global distributive justice proposed by John Rawls, David Miller, and Onora O'Neill. It would work well as a response to them, but also contains overviews of their positions (i.e. it isn't strictly necessary to be familiar with their body of work). The text contains illustrative examples of understanding collective responsibilities for injustice, such as goods produced in sweatshops. The text would work well in a course that covered distributive justice, social responsibility, or global justice.
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Added by: Olivia Maegaard NielsenAbstract:
When the noted political philosopher Iris Marion Young died in 2006, her death was mourned as the passing of “one of the most important political philosophers of the past quarter-century” (Cass Sunstein) and as an important and innovative thinker working at the conjunction of a number of important topics: global justice; democracy and difference; continental political theory; ethics and international affairs; and gender, race and public policy. This book discusses our responsibilities to address “structural” injustices in which we among many are implicated (but for which we are not to blame), often by virtue of participating in a market, such as buying goods produced in sweatshops, or participating in booming housing markets that leave many homeless. The book argues that addressing these structural injustices requires a new model of responsibility, which it calls the “social connection” model. The book develops this idea by clarifying the nature of structural injustice; developing the notion of political responsibility for injustice and how it differs from older ideas of blame and guilt; and finally how we can then use this model to describe our responsibilities to others no matter who we are and where we live.
Comment: This book is very suitable for teaching classes on justice, structures, or metaethics, since it at once covers various important ethical theories and theories of justice, while also asking a question that is still relevant to this day: what responsibility do we carry in the face of structural injustices? The book could be read in length, but the chapters can also be read individually.