Felappi, Giulia. ‘There is no reason for the necessity of the ultimate principles of deduction.’ Margaret Macdonald on logical necessity
2025, The Philosophical Quarterly, pqaf052
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Added by: Viviane Fairbank, Contributed by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
This paper aims at contributing to the recent enterprise of rediscovering Margaret Macdonald’s views, by focusing on her reflections on the necessity of logic, a theme that runs through many of her papers and reviews. We will see both Macdonald’s negative views about what the necessity of logic is not (Section I), and her positive view about what it is and how it supports her claim that it is in fact irrational to ask for a reason for the necessity of the ultimate principles of deduction, such as the Principle of Contradiction (Section II). To show how her view on the necessity of logic is different from others, such as David Lewis’s, we will then consider what she would reply to current rejectors of the Principle of Contradiction (Section III).Comment: This article provides a useful introduction to Margaret MacDonald's work in the mid-twentieth century on the topic of logical necessity. It goes over several possible accounts of the grounds of logical necessity and clearly articulates MacDonald's objections to them, as well as her own positive view on the matter; the final section places MacDonald's view in a contemporary context. As such, it might relevantly be included in any intermediate/advanced course on the epistemology and metaphysics of logic.
MacDonald, Margaret. Necessary Propositions
1940, Analysis, 7(2): 45–51
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Added by: Viviane Fairbank, Contributed by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
I should like to make a few comments on a recent article on necessary propositions by Mr. Norman Malcolm. Not so much because of anything specifically said by Mr. Malcolm as because his article expresses a prevalent view. Mr. Malcolm rejects what may be called the 'metaphysical' view of these propositions, viz. that they describe a special realm of necessary facts known by a kind of interior 'looking' called intuition or self-evidence. But the main concern of his paper is to reject also the later positivist view that they are 'really' verbal..., that they are rules of grammar or commands to use words in certain ways.Comment: In this short paper, MacDonald presents some objections to prominent views of logical necessity. The arguments are clear but require contextual knowledge of what was being discussed philosophically at the time, so some background would be useful.
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