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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Nora Heinzelmann
Introduction: Everyone familiar with the current mind-body debate has probably heard about Frank Jackson's neurophysiologist Mary. So I tell her story very briefly. Mary knows everything there is to know about the neurophysiological basis of human colour vision but she never saw colours herself (she always lived in a black-and-white environment). When Mary is finally released into the beauty of the coloured world, she acquires new knowledge about the world and - more specifically - about the character of the visual experiences of others. This appears clear at first sight. In the ongoing philosophical debate, however, there is no agreement about whether Mary really gains new knowledge and about whether this would, if it were so, represent a problem for physicalism. Those who defend the so-called argument from knowledge (or 'knowledge argument') think that it does.Sowaal, Alice. Mary Astell’s Serious Proposal: Mind, Method, and Custom2007, Philosophy Compass 2/2: 227-243.-
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Added by: Francesca Bruno
Abstract: In general outline, Astell’s A Serious Proposal to the Ladies is well understood. In Part I, Astell argues that women are educable, and she proposes the construction of a women’s academy. In Part II, she proposes a method for the improvement of the mind. In this article, I reconstruct and contextualize Astell’s arguments and proposals within her theory of mind and her account of the skeptical predicament that she sees as being endemic among women. I argue that Astell’s two proposals are best understood as strategies that, when employed, will allow women to critique prejudice and custom.Comment: This is a very accessible article and would be a good secondary source to assign for an introductory course reading Astell's work, ‘A Serious Proposal to the Ladies.’
Steward, Helen. The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States2000, Oxford: Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Jie Gao
Publisher's Note: This book puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the nature of some of the sorts of mental entities it postulates: the nature of events, processes, and states. The book offers an investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinction between them, and argues specifically that the assumption that states can be treated as particular, event-like entities has been a huge and serious mistake. The book argues that the category of token state should be rejected, and develops an alternative way of understanding those varieties of causal explanation which have sometimes been thought to require an ontology of token states for their elucidation. The book contends that many current theories of mind are rendered unintelligible once it is seen how these explanations really work. A number of prominent features of contemporary philosophy of mind token identity theories, the functionalists conception of causal role, a common form of argument for eliminative materialism, and the structure of the debate about the efficacy of mental content are impugned by the book's arguments. The book concludes that the modern mind-body problem needs to be substantially rethought.Comment: The aim of this book is to argue that issues in metaphysics - in particular issues about the nature of states and causation - have a significant impact in philosophy of mind.The book has three parts and each part can be used for different purposes for courses on metaphysics or philosophy of mind. The first part constitutes an attack to three highly influential theories of events (the views of Jaegwon Kim, Jonathan Bennett and Lawrence Lombard) and a defence of the view that events are "proper particulars". This part can be used as the main or secondary reading material in an upper-level course on metaphysics on topics of events. The second part defends the view that states are fundamentally different from events, which can be used for teaching on metaphysical theories of states or causal relation. The third part critically examines positions in philosophy of mind - in particular arguments for token-identity, epiphenomenalism, and eliminativism - need reconsideration. This part can be used as further reading materials on debates about those positions in philosophy of mind.
Taylor, Elanor. Explanation and the Explanatory Gap2016, Acta Analytica 31 (1):77-88.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: The Explanatory Gap' is a label for the idea that we cannot explain consciousness in terms of brain activity. There are many different formulations of the explanatory gap, but all discussion about it assumes that there is only one gap, which consists of the absence of a deductive explanation. This assumption is mistaken. In this paper, I show that the position that deductive explanation is privileged in this case is unmotivated. I argue that whether or not there is an explanatory gap depends on the kind of explanation in question, so there is no single, unified explanatory gap but only the absence and (perhaps) presence of different sorts of explanation.Comment:
Von Eckardt, Barbara. The representational theory of mind2012, In Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: It is argued that it is important for cognitive scientists to understand both the precise nature of RTM, and the challenges to it. The biggest foundational challenge is to develop an adequate naturalistic theory of how representational content is determined. Philosophers have proposed several ingenious theory-sketches of content determination but none accounts for the full range of semantic features mental representations arguably have. Another major challenge is the existence of non-representational competitor research programs. A likely future scenario is that we will be able to explain certain 'low-level' aspects of cognition without resort to representations but that representational hypotheses will still be needed to account for the intentionality-based features of cognition and 'representation hungry' higher-level processes.Comment:
Xiangshan, Lu. Recorded Sayings2009, In Ivanhoe, Philip (ed.), Readings from the Lu-Wang School of Neo-Confucianism. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company-
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Added by: Xintong WeiAbstract:
This volume provides selected translations from the writings of Lu Xiangshan; Wang Yangming; and the Platform Sutra, a work which had profound influence on neo-Confucian thought. Each of these three sections is preceded by an introduction that sketches important features of the history, biography, and philosophy of the author and explores some of the main features and characteristics of his work. The range of genres represented—letters, recorded sayings, essays, meditations and poetry—provide the reader with insights into the philosophical and stylistic themes of this fascinating and influential branch of neo-Confucian thought.
Comment:
available in this Blueprint
Xunzi. Chapter Nine: Xunzi2023, In Ivanhoe, Philip and Van Norden, Bryan (eds.), Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, 3rd edition. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company-
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Added by: Xintong WeiAbstract:
The third edition of Ivanhoe and Van Norden's acclaimed anthology builds on the strengths of previous editions with the addition of new selections for each chapter; selections from Shen Dao; a new translation of the writings of Han Feizi; selections from two texts, highly influential in later Chinese philosophy, the Great Learning and Mean ; and a complete translation of the recently discovered text Nature Comes from the Mandate . Each section of this volume begins with a brief Introduction and concludes with a lightly annotated Selective Bibliography. Also included are four appendices: Important Figures, Important Periods, Important Texts, and Important Terms.Comment:
available in this Blueprint
Yangming, Wang. Instructions for Practical Living2014, In Tiwald, Justin and Van Norden, Bryan (ed.), Readings in Later Chinese Philosophy: Han Dynasty to the 20th Century. Cambridge: Hackett-
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Added by: Xintong WeiAbstract:
An exceptional contribution to the teaching and study of Chinese thought, this anthology provides fifty-eight selections arranged chronologically in five main sections: Han Thought, Chinese Buddhism, Neo-Confucianism, Late Imperial Confucianism, and the early Twentieth Century. The editors have selected writings that have been influential, that are philosophically engaging, and that can be understood as elements of an ongoing dialogue, particularly on issues regarding ethical cultivation, human nature, virtue, government, and the underlying structure of the universe. Within those topics, issues of contemporary interest, such as Chinese ideas about gender and the experiences of women, are brought to light.Comment:
available in this Blueprint
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Nida-Rumelin, Martine. What Mary couldn’t know: Belief about phenomenal states
1995, In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 219--41.
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