Thomasson, Amie L.. Debates about the Ontology of Art: What are We Doing Here?
2006, Philosophy Compass 1 (3):245-255.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Abstract: Philosophers have placed some or all works of art in nearly every available ontological category, with some considering them to be physical objects, others abstract structures, imaginary entities, action types or tokens, and so on. How can we decide which among these views to accept? I argue that the rules of use for sortal terms like 'painting' and 'symphony' establish what ontological sorts of thing we are referring to with those terms, so that we must use a form of conceptual analysis in adjudicating these debates. This has several interesting consequences, including that revisionary answers are suspect, that adequate answers may require broadening our systems of categories, and that certain questions about the ontology of art - including the basic question 'What is the ontological status of the work of art?'- are ill?formed and unanswerable.Coleman, Elizabeth Burns. Aboriginal Painting: Identity and Authenticity2001, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 59(4): 385–402.-
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Added by: Erich Hatala Matthes
Summary: Coleman argues for an ontological understanding of Australian Aboriginal artworks (namely, that they function as insignia that require authoritative endorsement) that can resolve disputes about the authenticity of controversial cases of Aboriginal art. More broadly, her article illuminates the ways in which viewing art as part of a cultural heritage can affect how we understand its authenticity.Comment: This is a longer text that intersects with a number of other topics, including appropriation, art ontology, and the art-status of non-Western artworks. It could be used in the context of course units exploring any of those themes, or to raise them in the context of a unit on authenticity.
Yagisawa, Takashi. Against Creationism in Fiction2001, Noûs 35(s15): 153-172.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Sherlock Holmes is a fictional individual. So is his favorite pipe. Our pre-theoretical intuition says that neither of them is real. It says that neither of them really, or actually, exists. It also says that there is a sense in which they do exist, namely, a sense in which they exist "in the world of" the Sherlock Holmes stories. Our pre-theoretical intuition says in general of any fictional individual that it does not actually exist but exists "in the world of" the relevant fiction. I wish to defend this pre-theoretical intuition. To do so, I need to defend two claims: that fictional individuals do not actually exist, and that they exist "in the world of" the relevant fiction. The aim of this paper is to defend the first claim.Comment: A good argument against the existence of fictional characters. Clear presentation of the logic involved in various claims. In addition to ontology of art, the case of fictional characters can be an interesting way to present the arguments about ontology and linguistic commitment more generally, and this paper would be useful in that role as well.
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