Boden, Margaret A.. Intentionality and physical systems
1970, Philosophy of Science 32 (June):200-214.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: Intentionality is characteristic of many psychological phenomena. It is commonly held by philosophers that intentionality cannot be ascribed to purely physical systems. This view does not merely deny that psychological language can be reduced to physiological language. It also claims that the appropriateness of some psychological explanation excludes the possibility of any underlying physiological or causal account adequate to explain intentional behavior. This is a thesis which I do not accept. I shall argue that physical systems of a specific sort will show the characteristic features of intentionality. Psychological subjects are, under an alternative description, purely physical systems of a certain sort. The intentional description and the physical description are logically distinct, and are not intertranslatable. Nevertheless, the features of intentionality may be explained by a purely causal account, in the sense that they may be shown to be totally dependent upon physical processes.Dalla Chiara, Maria Luisa. Logical Self Reference, Set Theoretical Paradoxes and the Measurement Problem in Quantum Mechanics1977, International Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):331-347.-
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Added by: Sara Peppe
Introduction: From a logical point of view the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, can be described as a characteristic question of 'semantical closure' of a theory: to what extent can a consistent theory (in this case 2R) be closed with respect to the objects and the concepfs which are described and expressed in its metatheory?Comment: This paper considers the measurement problem in Quantum Mechanics from a logical perspective. Previous and deep knowledge of logics and Quantum Mechanics' theories is vital.
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