Fisher, Jennifer. On the Philosophy of Logic
2007, Cengage Learning.
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Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Matt ClemensPublisher's Note: Jennifer Fisher's On the Philosophy of Logic explores questions about logic often overlooked by philosophers. Which of the many different logics available to us is right? How would we know? What makes a logic right in the first place? Is logic really a good guide to human reasoning? An ideal companion text for any course in symbolic logic, this lively and accessible book explains important logical concepts, introduces classical logic and its problems and alternatives, and reveals the rich and interesting philosophical issues that arise in exploring the fundamentals of logic.Comment: This book provides an introduction to some traditional questions within philosophy of logic. Moreover, it presents some non-classical logics. It includes an introduction to formal classical logic, so no previous technical knowledge is required. Adequate for a first course on philosophy of logic, either as main or further reading.
Sher, Gila. Logical Quantifiers
2012, In D. Graff Fara & G. Russell (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 579-595.
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Added by: Berta GrimauAbstract: This article offers a logical, linguistic, and philosophical account of modern quantification theory. Contrasting the standard approach to quantifiers (according to which logical quantifiers are defined by enumeration) with the generalized approach (according to which quantifiers are defined systematically), the article begins with a brief history of standard quantifier theory and identifies some of its logical, linguistic, and philosophical strengths and weaknesses. It then proceeds to a brief history of generalized quantifier theory and explains how it overcomes the weaknesses of the standard theory. One of the main philosophical advantages of the generalized theory is its philosophically informative criterion of logicality. The paper describes the work done so far in this theory, highlights some of its central logical results, offers an overview of its main linguistic contributions, and discusses its philosophical significance.Comment: This paper is adequate for an advanced course on philosophy of logic or for a specialised course on quantification. It provides a presentation and a comparison of two different conceptions of quantification: standard modern quantification and generalised quantification. Interestingly, it presents the virtues and drawbacks of each of them from three different points of view: logical, linguistic and philosophical. Moreover, it puts special emphasis on the theme of which quantifiers are to count as logical by focusing on the criterion of logicality which is available for the generalized conception. It presupposes some knowledge of predicate logic as well as of set theory.
Silva, Francisca. First-Order Aboutness Theory
2025, Erkenntnis.
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
We seem to have a good grasp of how the subject matters of truth-functional composites depends on their components: it’s simply fusion (Hawke in Australas J Philos 96:697–723, 2018, Fine in Philos Studies 177:129–171, 2020, Plebani and Spolaore in Philos Q 71:605–622, 2021, Plebani and Spolaore in Philos Stud 181:247–265, 2021, Berto in Topics of Thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022). But what relation should the subject matter of subsentential components bear to the subject matter of the sentences they feature in, and what to say about the quantified sentences of first-order predicate logic? Given how well we seem to understand sentential subject matter in the context of propositional logic, I propose a reduction of the subject matter of subsentential components and of quantified sentences to the subject matter of quantifier-free sentences. I argue that the view squares with the Fregean intuitions that gave rise to the construction of first-order logic as we know it today, motivating its adequacy as a theory of subject matter for first-order languages. I then show that this first-order aboutness theory has predictive and explanatory power, leading us to accept a modified version of Yablo’s (Aboutness, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014) principle of immanent closure, as well as a new conception of arbitrary objects/reference. Finally, I propose some potential developments and restrictions.Comment: This paper is a useful example of the kind of work being done in contemporary aboutness theory and its associated formal tools, and hence might be referenced in any intermediate/advanced course on such topics.
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