Bernard Boxill. Self-Respect and Protest
1976, Philosophy and Public Affairs 6(1): 58-69.
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, Contributed by: Henry KrahnAbstract:
Must a person protest his wrongs? Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Dubois debated this question at the turn of the century. They did not disagree over whether protesting injustice was an effective way to right it, but over whether protesting injustice, when one could do nothing to right it oneself, was self-respecting. Washington felt that it was not. Thus, he did not deny that protest could help ameliorate conditions or that it was sometimes justified; what he did deny was that a person should keep protesting wrongs committed against him when he could not take decisive steps to end them. By insisting on "advertising his wrongs" in such cases, he argued, a person betrayed a weakness for relying, not on his "own efforts" but on the "sympathy" of others. Washington's position was that if a person felt wronged, he should do something about it; if he could do nothing he should hold his tongue and wait his opportunity; protest in such cases is only a servile appeal for sympathy; stoicism, by implication, is better. Dubois strongly contested these views. Not only did he deny that protest is an appeal for sympathy, he maintained that if a person failed to express openly his outrage at injustice, however assiduously he worked against it, he would in the long run lose his self-respect. Thus, he asserted that Washington faced a "paradox" by insisting both on "self-respect" and on "a silent submission to civic inferiority," and he declared that "only in a . . . persistent demand for essential equality . . . can any people show . . . a decent self-respect." Like Frederick Douglass, he concluded that people should protest their wrongs. In this essay I shall expand upon and defend Dubois' side of the debate. I shall argue that persons have reason to protest their wrongs not only to stop injustice but also to show self-respect and to know themselves as self-respecting.Comment: Boxill characterizes the debate between Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Dubois over protest and offers an original intervention: the self-respecting person has reason to protest in order to know that they have self-respect. This paper could be valuable as part of an advanced political philosophy syllabus on protest or as part of a syllabus on Africana philosophy.
Hsin-wen, Lee. Taking Deterrence Seriously: The Wide-Scope Deterrence Theory of Punishment
2017, Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (1):2-24.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Hsin-Wen LeeAbstract: A deterrence theory of punishment holds that the institution of criminal punishment is morally justified because it serves to deter crime. Because the fear of external sanction is an important incentive in crime deterrence, the deterrence theory is often associated with the idea of severe, disproportionate punishment. An objection to this theory holds that hope of escape renders even the severest punishment inapt and irrelevant.This article revisits the concept of deterrence and defend a more plausible deterrence theory of punishment - the wide-scope deterrence theory. The wide-scope theory holds that we must make the best use of all the deterrence tools available, including both external and internal sanctions. Drawing on insights from the early Confucian tradition, the article develops a deep deterrence theory, which holds that the most important deterrence tool involves internal, not external, sanction. It describes how internal sanctions deter potential offenses and why relevant policies need not conflict with liberalism's respect for neutrality.Comment: This text can be used in courses such as Philosophy of Law and/or Social and Political Philosophy.
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