Keyword: situated knowledge
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Haraway, Donna. Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective
1988, Feminist Studies 14(3), pp. 575-599
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Added by: Olivia Maegaard Nielsen
Abstract:

Academic and activist feminist inquiry has repeatedly tried to come to terms with the question of what we might mean by the curious and inescapable term "objectivity." We have used a lot of toxic ink and trees processed into paper decrying what they have meant and how it hurts us. The imagined "they" constitute a kind of invisible conspiracy of masculinist scientists and philosophers replete with grants and laboratories. The imagined "we" are the embodied others, who are not allowed not to have a body, a finite point of view, and so an inevitably disqualifying and polluting bias in any discussion of consequence outside our own little circles, where a "mass"-subscription journal might reach a few thousand
readers composed mostly of science haters.

Comment: A classic in feminist, postmodernist, and social epistemologies. In this text, Haraway introduces the concept 'situated knowledge', which plays a big role in many philosophical subfields, especially in standpoint epistemologies. It would be a great introductory text in seminars on feminist epistemology or as a complimentary critique in introductory epistemology courses.
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Huang, Ta-Lun Linus, et al.. Ameliorating Algorithmic Bias, or Why Explainable AI Needs Feminist Philosophy
2022, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 8 (3/4)
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Marilou Niedda
Abstract:

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly adopted to make decisions in domains such as business, education, health care, and criminal justice. However, such algorithmic decision systems can have prevalent biases against marginalized social groups and undermine social justice. Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) is a recent development aiming to make an AI system’s decision processes less opaque and to expose its problematic biases. This paper argues against technical XAI, according to which the detection and interpretation of algorithmic bias can be handled more or less independently by technical experts who specialize in XAI methods. Drawing on resources from feminist epistemology, we show why technical XAI is mistaken. Specifically, we demonstrate that the proper detection of algorithmic bias requires relevant interpretive resources, which can only be made available, in practice, by actively involving a diverse group of stakeholders. Finally, we suggest how feminist theories can help shape integrated XAI: an inclusive social-epistemic process that facilitates the amelioration of algorithmic bias.

Comment: It is an interesting text for students who work specifically with the concept of XAI (Explainability) in phil of AI. It offers an alternate perspective of this super technical/analytical concept. Can be used by students in computer science (in an ethics class, perhaps).
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