Filters

Topics (hold ctrl / ⌘ to select more or unselect)

Languages (hold ctrl / ⌘ to select more or unselect)

Traditions (hold ctrl / ⌘ to select more or unselect)

Times

-

Medium:

Recommended use:

Difficulty:


Full textRead freeSee used
Gendler, Tamar Szabó. Alief and Belief
2008, Journal of Philosophy 105 (10): 634-663.
Topics: Mental States and Processes; Theoretical Epistemology
Keywords: Aristotle; David Velleman; H. H. Price; Hume; John Bargh; Paul Rozin; affect; alief; belief; intuition; superstition; thought experiment; unconscious motivation; virtue ethics
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

Expand entry

Added by: Jie Gao

Abstract: I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. Paradigmatic alief can be characterized as a mental state with associatively-linked content that is representational, affective and behavioral, and that is activated - consciously or unconsciously - by features of the subject's internal or ambient environment. Alief is a more primitive state than either belief or imagination: it directly activates behavioral response patterns (as opposed to motivating in conjunction with desire or pretended desire.) I argue that alief explains a large number of otherwise perplexing phenomena and plays a far larger role in causing behavior than has typically been recognized by philosophers. I argue further that the notion can be invoked to explain both the effectiveness and the limitations of certain sorts of example-based reasoning, and that it lies at the core of habit-based views of ethics.

Comment: In this influential paper, Gendler argues for the existence of an important cognitive states that she calls alief. It is a highly-relevant material for teachings on many topics, for example forms of belief, rationality and belief, varieties of irrationality, implicit bias and etc, in upper-division undergraduate courses and postgraduate courses.

Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Introductory, Specialised

Export citation in BibTeX format
Export text citation
View this text on PhilPapers
Export citation in Reference Manager format
Export citation in EndNote format
Export citation in Zotero format

Share on Facebook Share on LinkedIn Share by Email
Full textRead freeSee used
Gendler, Tamar Szabó. Philosophical thought experiments, intuitions, and cognitive equilibrium
2007, French, Peter A. & Wettstein, Howard K. (eds). Philosophy and Empirical. Oxford: Blackwell. 68-89.
Topics: Mental States and Processes; Philosophical Media and Methodology; Theoretical Epistemology
Keywords: cognitive mechanism; conceptual reconfiguration; dual processing; imagination; intuition; reflective equilibrium; thought experiment
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

Expand entry

Added by: Jie Gao

Summary: Drawing on literature from the dual-processing tradition in psychology, this paper tries to explain why contemplation of an imaginary particular may have cognitive and motivational effects that differ from those evoked by an abstract description of the same content, and hence, why thought experiments may be effective devices for conceptual reconfiguration. It suggests that by presenting content in a suitably concrete way, thought experiments recruit representational schemas that were otherwise inactive, thereby evoking responses that may run counter to those evoked by alternative presentations of relevantly similar content.

Comment: In this interesting paper, Gendler elucidates the role and nature of intuition in the light of current philosophical practice. It is a good material for teaching on philosophical intuitions and experimental philosophy.

Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Introductory

Export citation in BibTeX format
Export text citation
View this text on PhilPapers
Export citation in Reference Manager format
Export citation in EndNote format
Export citation in Zotero format

Share on Facebook Share on LinkedIn Share by Email
Can’t find it?
Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!