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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: The author presents an argument for disregarding scepticism. Although she does not commit herself to saying that scepticism is false, she argues that it is, not only practicaly, yet epistemologically responsible to assume scepticism to be false.Elgin, Z. Catherine. Take it from me – the epistemological status of testimony2002, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV (2002), 291-308.-
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In this paper, the author addresses the problem of to what provides epistemic justification for taking someone's testimony as true. That is, to what extent testimony provides conveys warrant? More precisely, the author argues, contra C. J. A. Coady, that testimony does not easily provide warrant in most of the cases, yet the whether a testimony conveys warrant is context-sensitive: different levels of warrant are transmitted in different contexts.Comment: This could work as secondary reading for a postgraduate course in epistemology, focusin on the epistemology of testimony.
Ellis, Fiona. Atheism and Naturalism2017, in A. Carroll and R. Norman (eds.) Religion and Atheism: Beyond the Divide. London: Routledge-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Summary: Ellis argues that atheism and naturalism don't have to be traditionally-opposed rivals. First of all offers a helpful synopsis of these traditionally-opposed positions, and then argues that there is scope for allowing that nature is God-involving as well as being value-involving, and this move can be defended on (liberal) naturalistic grounds.Comment: A good paper to use for an atheism and agnosticism unit, especially as many do tend to use naturalism as an argument against the existence of God.
Eriksson, Lina, Alan Hájek. What are Degrees of Belief?2007, Studia Logica 86(2): 185-215.-
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Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Antony EagleAbstract:
Probabilism is committed to two theses: 1) Opinion comes in degrees - call them degrees of belief, or credences. 2) The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus. Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is: i) to give an account of what degrees of belief are, and then ii) to show that those things should be probabilities, on pain of irrationality. Most of the action in the literature concerns stage ii). Assuming that stage i) has been adequately discharged, various authors move on to stage ii) with varied and ingenious arguments. But an unsatisfactory response at stage i) clearly undermines any gains that might be accrued at stage ii) as far as probabilism is concerned: if those things are not degrees of belief, then it is irrelevant to probabilism whether they should be probabilities or not. In this paper, the authors scrutinize the state of play regarding stage i). We critically examine several of the leading accounts of degrees of belief: reducing them to corresponding betting behavior (de Finetti); measuring them by that behavior (Jeffrey); and analyzing them in terms of preferences and their role in decision-making more generally (Ramsey, Lewis, Maher). We argue that the accounts fail, and so they are unfit to subserve arguments for probabilism. We conclude more positively: "degree of belief" should be taken as a primitive concept that forms the basis of our best theory of rational belief and decision: probabilism.Comment: This paper is accessible to an advanced undergraduate audience in a formal philosophy course, since it provides an overview of the different accounts of the notion of degrees of belief. However, it's most adequate for graduate level, where it could be used in a formal epistemology course or in a course on the philosophy of probability.
Fileva, Iskra. Moral Testimony and Collective Moral Governance2023, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):722-735.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Ethan LandesAbstract:
I suggest that a moderate version of pessimism about moral testimony succeeds. However, I claim also that all major pessimist accounts—Understanding, Affect, Virtue, and Autonomy—fail. Having argued for these claims, I propose a new pessimist alternative.
Comment: The paper would offer a good overview of the current state of the moral testimony literature, specifically focusing on moral arguments against moral testimony. The paper moves through the literature quickly and breezily, explaining the key positions then offering a counterargument. It requires minimal knowledge of the literature, although it does presuppose some familiarity with what testimony is meant to be.
Fricker, Elizabeth. Against Gullibility1994, In: Matilals, Bimal K. & Chakrabarti, A. (eds.), Knowing from Words: Western and Indian philosophical analysis of understanding and testimony. Kluwer. 125-161-
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Added by: Jie Gao
Summary: This paper refutes the PR thesis according to which the hearer has such a special presumptive right to trust the speaker's assertion. The refutation consists of 1) arguing against that it is not possible for a hearer to obtain independent confirmation that a given speaker is trustworthy - that what she says will be true; 2) a full rejection to various positive arguments for a PR which may be made.Comment: This paper defends anti-reductionism by refuting arguments for reductionism. It is useful paper for teachings on testimony in a upper-level undergraduate course on epistemology.
Fricker, Elizabeth. Critical notice: Telling and trusting: Reductionism and anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony1995, Mind 104 (414): 393-411.-
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Added by: Jie Gao
Abstract: In this review I focus on the arguments advanced by Coady in the main task to which he addresses himself in Testimony: arguing the case against the reductive position, and in favour of a non-reductive conception of testimonial knowledge. I introduce some distinctions which I believe enable the subject to taken further.Comment: This review critically discusses the first book on testimony in contemporary philosophy and advances the dabates. It is a very good background reading for courses on epistemology or social epistemology. It saves students from reading Coady's original book.
Fricker, Elizabeth. Epistemic Trust in Oneself and Others – and Argument from Analogy?2014, in Laura Frances Callahan & Timothy O'Connor (eds.) Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: Richard Foley and others have recently argued that there is an a priori connection between rational trust in one's own faculties to rational trust of other human persons. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that we must instead establish through empirical observation which others are to be trusted and under which circumstances - there is no rational presumption of the trustworthiness of others. Hence, insofar as one's religious beliefs are based on trust in the testimony of others, rationality requires that one assess the credentials of those whom one trusts.Comment: A great primary reading for a religious epistemology course, or otherwise a great secondary reading for a more general philosophy of religion course, for a unit on Faith. If being used as a primary reading, it could be good to ask students to explain whether and why they agree that religious beliefs are based on trust in the testimony of others - and, if they do agree, whether this is problematic? What other (non-religious) cases can they think of where our beliefs are based on trust in the testimony of others?
Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice: The Power and Ethics of Knowing2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press-
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Added by: Tomasz Zyglewicz, Shannon Brick, Michael GreerPublisher’s Note:
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.Comment (from this Blueprint): In this excerpt, Miranda Fricker introduces the concept of testimonial injustice.
Fricker, Miranda. Rational Authority and Social Power: Toward a Truly Social Epistemology1998, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98(2): 159-177.-
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Added by: Jie Gao
Abstract: This paper explores the relation between rational authority and social power, proceeding by way of a philosophical genealogy derived from Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. The position advocated avoids the errors both of the 'traditionalist' (who regards the socio-political as irrelevant to epistemology) and of the 'reductivist' (who regards reason as just another form of social power). The argument is that a norm of credibility governs epistemic practice in the state of nature, which, when socially manifested, is likely to imitate the structures of social power. A phenomenon of epistemic injustice is explained, and the politicizing implication for epistemology educed.Comment: In this paper, Fricker lays out an approach to social epistemology, one that gives the field a particular tight connect to political philosophy. Suitable as an introductory reading for courses on social epistemology or epistemology in general.
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Elgin, Z. Catherine. Scepticism Aside
2010, in Joseph Keim Campell, Michael O'Rourke and Harry (eds.), Knowledge and Scepticism Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010, 309-324. ed. Silverstein
Comment: This can be used as further reading for problematization of skepticism; it focusses on the epistemological problems of scepticism and discusses their practical implications.