Brownlee, Kimberley. The Lonely Heart Breaks: On The Right to Be a Social Contributor
2016, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):27-48
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This paper uncovers a distinctively social type of injustice that lies in the kinds of wrongs we can do to each other specifically as social beings. In this paper, social injustice is not principally about unfair distributions of socio-economic goods among citizens. Instead, it is about the ways we can violate each other’s fundamental rights to lead socially integrated lives in close proximity and relationship with other people. This paper homes in on a particular type of social injustice, which we can call social contribution injustice. The paper identifies two distinct forms of social contribution injustice. The first form involves compromising a person’s social resources so as to deny her adequate scope to contribute socially. The second form involves unjustly misvaluing a person as a social contributor, usually by not taking her seriously as a social contributor.
Comment: This paper offers a unique account of what distinguishes social contribution from other social goods, and makes an interesting defense of contribution as a right. It is especially relevant for discussing the extent to which we have social rights, and determining their scope, or their relationship to basic human rights. It might be useful to offer as further reading for a course on applied ethics, or could be used as a central reading in courses which focus on human rights or social rights. It also puts forward a novel understanding of social injustice which is grounded, not in distribution of goods, but in violation of rights. This aspect of the argument could be relevant to a more general discussion on conceptions of social justice.
Brownlee, Kimberley. Freedom of Association: It’s Not What You Think
2015, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 35 (2):267-282
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This article shows that associative freedom is not what we tend to thinkit is. Contrary to standard liberal thinking, it is neither a general moral permissionto choose the society most acceptable to us nor a content-insensitive claim-rightakin to the other personal freedoms with which it is usually lumped such asfreedom of expression and freedom of religion. It is at most (i) a highly restrictedmoral permission to associate subject to constraints of consent, necessity andburdensomeness; (ii) a conditional moral permission not to associate provided ourassociative contributions are not required; and (iii) a highly constrained, contentsensitive moral claim-right that protects only those wrongful associations thathonour other legitimate concerns such as consent, need, harm and respect. Thisarticle also shows that associative freedom is not as valuable as we tend to think itis. It is secondary to positive associative claim-rights that protect our fundamentalsocial needs and are pre-conditions for any associative control worth the name.
Comment: This paper offers a novel account of associative freedom, which counters existing philosophical consensus in the literature and proposes an account grounded in more positive claim-rights that we have as human beings to hold intimate associations throughout our lives. As such, it could be included in a course exploring the fundamentals of social philosophy, as a way to explore the basic requirements we have for social resources, as well as the rights/freedoms/obligations/duties that surround those requirements. It could also be useful as a core text in more traditional topic areas like political theory, human rights, or basic freedoms, or further reading as a counterposition to more traditional claims in those areas.
Buchak, Lara. Risk and Rationality
2013, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Jie GaoPublisher's Note: Lara Buchak sets out a new account of rational decision-making in the face of risk. She argues that the orthodox view is too narrow, and suggests an alternative, more permissive theory: one that allows individuals to pay attention to the worst-case or best-case scenario, and vindicates the ordinary decision-maker.Comment: This book argues for an alternative account of ideal rationality as opposed to the orthodox view in terms of expected utility theory. Buchak manages to explain the technical details of her theory in such a non-technical way that any student of philosophy will be able to follow her discussion. The book moreover contains very interesting passages on what we might call "the philosophy of decision theory", such as metaphysical and epistemological issues concerning utilities and probabilities. This makes it a good teaching material for courses on decision theory and philosophy of action.
Buchak, Lara. Faith and Steadfastness in the face of Counter-Evidence
2017, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81(1-2): 113-133.
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Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: It is sometimes said that faith is recalcitrant in the face of new evidence, but it is puzzling how such recalcitrance could be rational or laudable. I explain this aspect of faith and why faith is not only rational, but in addition serves an important purpose in human life. Because faith requires maintaining a commitment to act on the claim one has faith in, even in the face of counter-evidence, faith allows us to carry out long-term, risky projects that we might otherwise abandon. Thus, faith allows us to maintain integrity over time.Comment: This would be a great paper to set for further reading, with Buchak's 'Can it be Rational to Have Faith'? as a primary reading. It could alternatively be a primary reading, but in a more specialised Philosophy of Religion course - for instance, one that is specifically on Religious Epistemology or on Faith and Reason.
Buchak, Lara. Can it be Rational to Have Faith?
2012, in Jake Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.) Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press: 225-247.
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Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn't require adopting a degree of belief that isn't supported by one's evidence but rather it requires terminating one's search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a number of circumstances. If expected utility theory is the correct account of practical rationality, then having faith can be both epistemically and practically rational if the costs associated with gathering further evidence or postponing the decision are high. If a more permissive framework is adopted, then having faith can be rational even when there are no costs associated with gathering further evidenceComment: A great paper for an intermediate philosophy of religion course, especially because many arguments from students are to the contrary: it's irrational to believe in God when we don't have satisfactory evidence. It could be nice to set up a debate centering around this paper. It could work particularly well towards the end of the course.
Buchak, Lara. Rational Faith and Justified Belief
2014, in Laura Frances Callahan & Timothy O'Connor (eds.) Reigious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford University Press: 49-73.
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Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: In 'Can it be rational to have faith?', it was argued that to have faith in some proposition consists, roughly speaking, in stopping one's search for evidence and committing to act on that proposition without further evidence. That paper also outlined when and why stopping the search for evidence and acting is rationally required. Because the framework of that paper was that of formal decision theory, it primarily considered the relationship between faith and degrees of belief, rather than between faith and belief full stop. This paper explores the relationship between rational faith and justified belief, by considering four prominent proposals about the relationship between belief and degrees of belief, and by examining what follows about faith and belief according to each of these proposals. It is argued that we cannot reach consensus concerning the relationship between faith and belief at present because of the more general epistemological lack of consensus over how belief relates to rationality: in particular, over how belief relates to the degrees of belief it is rational to have given one's evidence.Comment: This could be a great paper to set for further reading, with Buchak's 'Can it be Rational to Have Faith?' as a primary reading. If being discussed as a primary reading, it would be good to get very clear on Buchak's four candidates for the relationship between belief and degrees of belief: perhaps by splitting the room into four groups, and getting each group to discuss one proposal - as well as what follows about the relationship between faith and belief according to that proposal.
Burkhart, Brian. Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land: A Trickster Methodology of Decolonising Environmental Ethics and Indigenous Futures
2019, Michigan State University Press.
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Added by: Sonja Dobroski and Quentin PharrPublisher’s Note:
Land is key to the operations of coloniality, but the power of the land is also the key anticolonial force that grounds Indigenous liberation. This work is an attempt to articulate the nature of land as a material, conceptual, and ontological foundation for Indigenous ways of knowing, being, and valuing. As a foundation of valuing, land forms the framework for a conceptualization of Indigenous environmental ethics as an anticolonial force for sovereign Indigenous futures. This text is an important contribution in the efforts to Indigenize Western philosophy, particularly in the context of settler colonialism in the United States. It breaks significant ground in articulating Indigenous ways of knowing and valuing to Western philosophy—not as artifact that Western philosophy can incorporate into its canon, but rather as a force of anticolonial Indigenous liberation. Ultimately, Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land shines light on a possible road for epistemically, ontologically, and morally sovereign Indigenous futures.Comment: available in this Blueprint
Buss, Sarah. Personal autonomy
2008, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktAbstract: To be autonomous is to be a law to oneself; autonomous agents are self-governing agents. Most of us want to be autonomous because we want to be accountable for what we do, and because it seems that if we are not the ones calling the shots, then we cannot be accountable. More importantly, perhaps, the value of autonomy is tied to the value of self-integration. We don't want to be alien to, or at war with, ourselves; and it seems that when our intentions are not under our own control, we suffer from self-alienation. What conditions must be satisfied in order to ensure that we govern ourselves when we act? Philosophers have offered a wide range of competing answers to this question.
Butler, Judith, Athena Athanasiou. The Political Promise of the Performative
2013, In: Dispossession: The Performative in the Political. London: Polity. 140-148.
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Added by: Rossen VentzislavovSummary: In this conversation Butler and Athanasiou explore the parameters of the public performance of political dissent. They discuss instances of political protest that link up to Butler and Athanasiou's shared sense of performativity. For the two of them, performativity is the aspect of our social life that manifests surprise, challenge and urgency through the human body. This makes the performative an especially effective instrument against the disparity, dispossession and desperation the better part of humanity is forced to endure.Comment: This text is best used as a further or specialised reading in classes on political dissent and subversion of social norms. It can inspire interesting discussions on ways to express dissent and protest, and can be very useful in discussions of politically involved art.
Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity
1999, Routledge.
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Added by: Emily PaulPublisher's note: Arguing that traditional feminism is wrong to look to a natural, 'essential' notion of the female, or indeed of sex or gender, Butler starts by questioning the category 'woman' and continues in this vein with examinations of 'the masculine' and 'the feminine'. Best known however, but also most often misinterpreted, is Butler's concept of gender as a reiterated social performance rather than the expression of a prior reality.Comment: All of this book would be very useful for a feminist philosophy course, but chapter 1 in particular would be great to use for a unit on the metaphysics of gender, by considering Butler's account of gender being performative, and how this links in with the social constructivist account of gender.
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