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Added by: Erich Hatala Matthes
Summary: In this paper, Thompson sets up a potential tension between two kinds of cases. On the one hand, we might think it is wrong for a wealthy collector to destroy great works of Western art that have value for all of humanity. On the other hand, we might think it is acceptable for indigenous peoples to rebury or ritually destroy artifacts from their culture, even though these works might also have value for all of humanity. How do we reconcile these intuitions? After discussing and dismissing attempts to resolve the problem by appeal to the value of the property for its possessors or the desires of non-owners, Thompsons suggests that by looking at the value of art in the context of different cultural traditions we can see why a certain universalism about the value of art will tell against allowing the destruction of artwork by the wealthy collector, but allow for the reburial or destruction of artifacts by certain indigenous communities.Thompson, Judith Jarvis. Molyneux’s Problem1974, Journal of Philosophy 71: 637-650.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Simon Prosser
Introduction: I am inclined to think that what was in Molyneux’s mind, because of which he drew that conclusion from those premises, was this: that what affects one’s touch so or so could have affected one’s sight such and such instead of so or so—i.e., that what feels so or so could have looked such and such instead of so or so. Thus, for example, that what standardly feels like a globe could have standardly looked like a cube instead of like a globe, and vice versa. Certainly anyway, if you did think this, it would seem to you plausible to say that if a man hasn’t had the experience of how things that feel so or so look, he can’t tell by sight, i.e., from how a thing looks, how it feels. And plausible, then, to reason, as Molyneux does, that, if a man hasn’t had the experience of how things that feel so or so look, he can’t tell by sight, i.e., from how a thing looks, whether it feels like, and so is, a globe, or whether it feels like, and so is, a cube. The best he can do is guess.
It’s a proposal worth looking at, in any case, whether it is Molyneux’s or not. Or rather, under some interpretations of it, it's a proposal worth looking at.
Comment: Classic article on Molyneux's problem; maybe not the main reading these days, but important background/further reading.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. A Defense of Abortion1971, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Content: Thomson aims to see if abortion can be defended even if the anti-abortion theorist is granted their key premise, i.e. that the foetus has the status of a person. Thomson argues that this is, in fact, irrelevant since we do not owe it to others to let them use our body in order to survive.Comment: This text offers one of the central arguments in favour of moral permissibility of abortion and features the 'famous violinist' thought experiment. It is a central reading for any module in applied ethics focusing on abortion.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. Self-defense1991, Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (4):283-310.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Introduction: But what if in order to save one’s life one has to kill another person? In some cases that is obviously permissible. In a case I will call Villainous Aggressor, you are standing in a meadow, innocently minding your own business, and a truck suddenly heads toward you. You try to sidestep the truck, but it turns as you turn. Now you can see the driver: he is a man you know has long hated you. What to do? You cannot outrun the truck. Fortunately, this is not pure nightmare: you just happen to have an antitank gun with you, and can blow up the truck. Of course, if you do this you will kill the driver, but that does not matter; it is morally permissible for you to blow up the truck, driver and all, in defense of your life.Comment: The text discusses permissible and excusable self-defence reactions towards different types of aggressors. It is useful in teaching on issues involving the doctrine of double effect.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments1999, Ethics 109 (3):497-518.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Introduction: What I will discuss are two of the moral arguments that have been put forward as reasons for objecting to the legalization of physician-assisted suicide. They have been taken seriously by a great many people and have had a powerful impact on the state of American law in this area. I will argue that they are bad arguments. I should say at the outset, however, that even if these are bad arguments, there may be others that are better. Many people oppose the legalizing of physician-assisted suicide on the ground that (as they think) there is no way of constraining the practice so as to provide adequate protections for the poor and the weak. They may be right, and if they are, then all bets are off. Alternatively, they may be wrong. I will simply bypass this issue.Comment: The two arguments focus on the distinction between killing and letting die, and the doctrine of double effect. The arguments offered are central to the discussion on the moral permissibility of euthanasia and assisted suicide, which makes this text very useful in teaching applied ethics. It can be also useful in more general teaching on the doctrine of double effect.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. McTaggart on Time2001, Noûs 35(s15): 229-252.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Introduction: McTaggart's argument for the conclusion that time does not exist is notoriously hard to understand. C. D. Broad says that when properly interpreted, its main part can be seen to be "a philosophical 'howler'." Others see things in it that they regard as true and important, or if not true, then anyway important. But I have not seen any interpretation of it that seems to me to get it exactly right. And I think that it pays to get it right: there are lessons to be learned from consideration of what goes on in it. By way of reminder, McTaggart's argument has two parts. The first part aims at the conclusion that time does not exist unless the A series exists. The second part aims at the conclusion that the A series does not exist. It follows that time does not existComment: One of the clearest statements of McTaggart's argument about time; the interpretation is well-argued for. Very helpful as an aid to comprehension if McTaggart's argument is taught, as it usually would be in any examination of philosophy of time.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. Goodness and Utilitarianism1994, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 67(4): 5-21.-
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Added by: Chris Howard
Summary: This article argues that there is no property of being good simpliciter, that all goodness is goodness-in-a-way. It draws out the (damaging) implications of this result for consequentialism.Comment: This article offers a famous objection to ulitiltarianism/consequentialism, namely that the property of being good (simpliciter) to which consquentialism appeals does not exist; 'good' is incomplete. It would be a great addition to a contemporary normative ethics course, in a unit on consequentialism's most famous critiques.
Tiberius, Valerie. Humean Heroism: Value Commitments and the Source of Normativity2000, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81(4) 426-46.-
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Added by: Graham Bex-Priestley
Abstract: This paper addresses the question "In virtue of what do practical reasons have normative force or justificatory power?" There seems to be good reason to doubt that desires are the source of normativity. However, I argue that the reasons to be suspicious of desire-based accounts of normativity can be overcome by a sufficiently sophisticated account. The position I defend in this paper is one according to which desires, or more generally, proattitudes, do constitute values and provide rational justifications of actions when they are organized in the right way.Comment: A good defence of desire-based accounts of value, tackling some of the most intuitive objections (such as being "too subjective" and having no foundation in reason).
Tiberius, Valerie. Constructivism and Wise Judgment2012, in Lenman, J. and Shemmer, Y. (eds.) Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 195-212.-
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Added by: Carl Fox
Abstract: In this paper I introduce a version of constructivism that relies on a theory of practical wisdom. Wise judgment constructivism is a type of constructivism because it takes correct judgments about what we have “all-in” reason to do to be the result of a process we can follow, where our interest in the results of this process stems from our practical concerns. To fully defend the theory would require a comprehensive account of wisdom, which is not available. Instead, I describe a constructivist methodology for defending an account of wisdom and outline its main features. This gives us enough to see what wise judgment constructivism would look like, why it might be an attractive theory, and how it is different from other versions of constructivism.Comment: Original and illuminating approach to constructivism. Particularly suited to further or specialised reading.
Tiberius, Valerie. Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction2015, New York, NY: Routledge.-
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Added by: Carl FoxPublisher’s Note:
Publisher: This is the first philosophy textbook in moral psychology, introducing students to a range of philosophical topics and debates such as: What is moral motivation? Do reasons for action always depend on desires? Is emotion or reason at the heart of moral judgment? Under what conditions are people morally responsible? Are there self-interested reasons for people to be moral? Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction presents research by philosophers and psychologists on these topics, and addresses the overarching question of how empirical research is relevant to philosophical inquirComment: Wide-ranging introductory textbook. Very useful for introductory readings to a range of issues in and around moral psychology.
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Thompson, Janna. Art, Property Rights, and the Interests of Humanity
2004, Journal of Value Inquiry 38(4): 545-560.
Comment: This paper pairs well with Kwame Anthony Appiah's 'Whose Culture Is It, Anyway?' or Peter Lindsay's "Can We Own the Past? Cultural Artifacts as Public Goods." It is particularly good at engaging questions about the universal value of art and its implications for ownership introduced in those texts.